I am currently writing a chapter for an academic (edited) textbook about Media and Politics in New Zealand. My chapter is on how politicians interact with the media, and the tools they use - in particular spin doctors. I'm keen for any ideas and feedback on what is important to discuss. My previous version of the chapter (from 2012) is reproduced below. All feedback is welcome. [Read more below]
Introduction
New Zealand political parties and politicians now carry out their election campaigns on a permanent basis, mostly via the media. To do this they use numerous strategies and devices. Central to these media strategies are the party professionals they employ, who represent the ‘PR-isation’ of politics that has dramatically changed political parties. Working under titles such as ‘press secretary’, ‘adviser’, or ‘media minder’ – but often referred to as ‘spin doctors’ – these professionals epitomise the nature of the relationship between politicians and the media in New Zealand. These individuals often lack a political or ideological background but have significant power because of their command of media and communication expertise. This chapter explores their role and the strategies that party professionals and their politicians deploy to attempt to win and retain popular support.
A challenging media environment
Politics has been likened to warfare, in which there is constant struggle for dominance by a number of important actors. The terrain on which this battle takes place is mostly in the media. Newspapers, radio, television and other new technologies are not merely one part of politics, but the main vehicle. Hence the various political actors devote much of their energy and resources to this arena.
The media arena is challenging for politicians. A number of factors mean this terrain is hostile, and journalists themselves can be aggressive players. One factor is the changes in technology that have brought about a 24-hour news cycle demanding constant political material. Changes in media culture also mean the media is often sensationalist and superficial in its coverage. Television, in particular, has made political communication much more image-oriented and encouraged sound bites, stunts and colourful leadership (see Chapter 15).
The nature of New Zealand media has become more challenging for politicians since the 1980s in particular. This is partly related to changing international fashions in political journalism whereby assertive journalists have been more inclined to challenge politicians and governments – especially following the Watergate scandal in the United States. Journalism has become more confident of its role to seek out scandals, wrongdoing, conflict and untruths. Overall there is a less reverential approach towards Parliament and government.
Party professionals
In New Zealand’s modern ‘public relations politics’, party professionals play the central role in the dynamic between politicians and the media. They are largely responsible for the strategies of political communication and dealing with the media. But who are these people and how many are there? By the end of its time in power, Helen Clark’s Labour Government (1999–2008) employed 80 such party professionals (45 communicators and 35 political advisers). Opposition parties together employed a similar number of such staff.
There are numerous roles and job titles of staff working in party political roles, from chief press secretaries to executive assistants. While the role of ‘press secretary’ is most obviously associated with media management, the other roles are also inevitably related to the wider media function. When it comes to political communications, there are no strong boundaries or clear differentiation between many staff roles – they are all employed in the role of political management, which invariably means political communication.
The large number of party professionals working in the New Zealand Parliament is a relatively new phenomenon. Previously, professional staff were rare (beyond the impartial public servants seconded from various government departments). For instance, when Keith Holyoake was prime minister in the 1960s, he had only one press secretary (who also doubled as a private secretary). Cabinet ministers soon obtained press secretarial assistance, but this was supplied by public servants seconded from the old Tourist and Publicity Department.
Opposition political parties were entitled to few staff. In contrast with modern opposition offices, in the late 1960s, Labour leader Norman Kirk relied upon the support of a messenger, a typist and a personal private secretary, and it was not until 1974 that an Opposition leader was able to employ a press secretary (Klinkum 1998, p.407). However, by the early 1980s, the Leader of the Opposition had six support staff. By 1990, there were nine, with a budget of over $700,000. Opposition resources multiplied over the next two decades, particularly following publication of the Parliamentary Service-commissioned Hunn-Lang Report in 1990.
The prime minister’s office and those of other ministers employed more professional staff in the 1970s, especially after Robert Muldoon, prime minister from 1975 to 1984, set up both his own prime minister’s department and, more importantly, a small advisory group of experts seconded for approximately two-year terms from both the private and public sectors (Henderson 2001, p.111). When David Lange became prime minister in 1984, the private office of the prime minister went from 10 staff to about 20, and then to 27 under Geoffrey Palmer in 1989. Staff numbers continued to increase and, when Jenny Shipley was prime minister (1997–1999), she ‘set a record for having the biggest crew of communication staff and media advisers yet hired by a prime minister’ (Catherall 1998). In her media team alone, Shipley had eight staff, compared to her predecessor’s communications team of three (Henderson 2001, p.112).
The number of (non-seconded) staff in ministerial offices has also increased dramatically. Between 1989 and 1997, their number rose from 45 to 145. After the election of the Helen Clark Labour Government in 1999, ministerial staff numbers increased further, from 198 to 220, rising again after 2002 to 232.
These professional staff now commonly originate from media backgrounds. Previously such staff had tended to come from government departments, but in the late 1980s the Labour Government employed 12 journalists as ministerial advisers. This was soon surpassed by the next National Government whose 25 ministers used 32 media officers (Hope 2001, p.314). These ex-journalists are often from the parliamentary press gallery. For example, in 1993 the Evening Post’s Mike Munro pointed out that there were now nine ex-parliamentary gallery journalists working as press minders (Munro 1993). A couple of years later Munro swapped sides himself, to work for Helen Clark.
Roles of party professionals
Parliament’s party professionals are technically employed as public servants, but they are not working in the apolitical role traditionally expected of such government employees. Instead they are usually working explicitly as party political staff with all this entails – effectively involved in the permanent campaign of partisan electioneering.
In their general role of political communications, party professionals carry out a range of functions on behalf of politicians, including writing speeches and opinion pieces, producing press releases, arranging formal announcements and photo-opportunities, and promoting policy decisions and initiatives. A key role of party professionals is to liaise with the media – and with the parliamentary press gallery in particular. Much of this involves feeding the journalist with information, sometimes in the form of briefings and ‘off-the-record’ backgrounders. In addition it involves escorting politicians to the press gallery. As Patricia Herbert, Michael Cullen’s press secretary while he was Minister of Finance (1999–2008) said, ‘Once a month I try to take him around the gallery for on and off the record chats with journalists. It takes about an hour but it’s a good use of time’ (quoted in Coddington 2001, p.69).
In general, the staffers build up relationships with specific journalists, with the goal of seeking to influence their reportage and the agenda. Sometimes this relationship will involve the offer of exclusive stories to journalists, in the hope of favourable coverage or future favours in return. Friendly media agencies and journalists will also be given politicians’ strategies, themes and talking points.
Inevitably the staffers also have to deal with journalists who have reported negatively about politicians, or at least in ways the politicians do not approve. It is the job of staff to meet with negative journalists and either harangue or charm them, or use leverage to persuade them – this often means threatening to ‘freeze’ them out or cut them off from the supply of information and access to politicians.
The ambiguous term ‘spin doctoring’ is often used about the role of party professionals in Parliament (see also Chapter 6). Although no agreed definition exists for this role, it is essentially that of manufacturing and maintaining a positive profile for their employer and, when events put that politician in the media spotlight, putting a positive spin on their activities. But spin doctoring is not just about a positive spin on your own side, but also trying to put a negative spin on opposition activities. Much attention is paid to opponents – creating negative attack lines and attempting to run smear campaigns. Party professionals are increasingly occupied with this strategy because the media is highly receptive to political scandals and negative stories about politicians. Under-resourced journalists are therefore very happy to be provided with information that politicians are reluctant to use themselves for fear of incurring damage from any fallout. The parties’ research units are especially focused on this, putting significant resources into monitoring and transcribing the comments of rival MPs and parties, which they use to uncover inconsistent or embarrassing statements that can be drawn to the attention of journalists.
Anna Kominik, former press secretary to Prime Minister Jim Bolger (1990–1997), has described how ‘it is easy to manipulate what is going on’ on behalf of politicians, saying that the best spin doctors ‘would know where to plant information and a storm would be created or the storm would be abated’ (quoted in Comrie 2012, p.119).
Strategies for dealing with the media
Party professionals need to advise their employers on strategies for dealing with the media. For example, one classic technique for releasing bad news to avoid widespread publication is the ‘Friday dump’, whereby numerous negative stories are released to journalists close to the end of the week in the hope they will not get much attention. A similar technique is to release bad news when plenty of diversions are taking place.
When a particular journalist or news agency is known by a party to be working on a potentially embarrassing story, the party will sometimes attempt to destroy their scoop by alerting rival journalists and media. The party can therefore pre-empt the publication of a negative story and attempt to get their own (less negative) version of the story into the public domain.
Generally the most important media strategy is to keep a party’s politicians ‘on-message’. This involves much central coordination and control from the professionals to ensure that no-one breaks ranks and gives the impression of disunity. As National Party MP Lockwood Smith said, ‘Rarely now will the media find members of parliament talking too openly about issues. The party line tends to be emphasised’ (quoted in Comrie 2012, p.118). Such centralisation was evident among National candidates in the 2008 general election who were prohibited from dealing with the national media and had instructions to pass any media requests onto the head office. One candidate let slip during the campaign that he found this ‘bloody frustrating’ (Dickson, 2008).[K1]
Another example where the degree of centralisation is seen as extreme is when party candidates and MPs individually publish press releases prepared by the communication staff, simply altering the names of the politicians and their electorates. For example, in the 2011 election, numerous National candidates were discovered to be announcing their candidacy with the same quotes about how they felt about being selected and what the issues were in their electorates (Hartevelt 2011).
Such control is extended, where possible, to journalists, too. Political reporters get little advance warning of where party leaders will be and are left scrambling in their wake, hoping for an unguarded remark, an unexpected drama. Fairfax political editor Tracy Watkins commented during the 2011 campaign on the lack of logistical information provided to those covering the politicians:
The National and Labour leaders’ diaries are closely guarded secrets – journalists are given flight details a few days in advance, but times, places, meetings are withheld. (National, surprisingly, is more forthcoming than Labour.) We wait expectantly for an email to land in our inbox the night before, filling in the blanks (2011).
Because of the challenging nature of the mainstream media, much effort is put into attempts to side-step its more difficult elements and find ways to get unmediated political communication to voters. Party professionals use their experience of media practices to achieve this. On one level there are simple tactics such as organising teams of party activists to write ‘letters to the editor’ of various newspapers. Politicians are directed to all sorts of alternative media, such as the internet, which cut out the media gatekeepers completely. In 2012, for example, National ministers started filming their media releases for viewing on YouTube.
The main strategy for by-passing the more aggressive mainstream media is by turning to more soft-news outlets. Hence politicians frequently host talkback radio shows, do feature interviews with women’s magazines, and participate in lifestyle television shows. National Prime Minister John Key is adept at using these strategies – he hosted his own RadioLive shows (interviewing his chosen guests), appeared on TV3’s Gone Fishin’ show, and did long-form interviews on Radio Sport.
Increasingly the media is by-passed by the tactic of non-participation. Politicians are advised simply not to be interviewed, and certainly not by some of the more searching and aggressive interviewers. This became especially obvious within the John Key National-led Government, particularly towards the end of its first term (2008–2011).
Radio New Zealand (RNZ) became one of the objects of this effective boycott by the prime minister and his colleagues. Traditionally, politicians have seen RNZ’s Morning Report as a crucial vehicle for participation because it has a strong agenda-setting function, due to so many other media and politicians listening to the programme. However, during a five-month period in 2010, John Key turned down all but three requests to appear on Morning Report. In the 2011 election year, the refusals increased. RNZ’s head of news, Don Rood, took the unusual step of publicly voicing the agency’s experience with National MPs. He was reported as saying that the prime minister ‘refused to front for both of their scheduled election debates with Labour leader Phil Goff on Morning Report – despite requesting the interview at the start of the year’ (Whitworth 2011). Rood said that ‘even during the year some National MPs have been “hesitant” to appear on the station and have often pulled out’. When RNZ attempted to put together a compendium of the various parties’ policies for its website, it had to report ‘National has declined to engage’ (Whitworth 2011).
TV3’s Chris Whitworth complained that ‘The problem could be excused if Radio New Zealand was alone in this, but National’s reluctance to front appears to be industry wide’ (2011). He catalogued the other media that Key had supposedly evaded – including TV3’s Campbell Live, TVNZ’s Close Up, and The New Zealand Herald’s attempt at hosting a leaders’ debate with Phil Goff. The Herald’s Jonathan Milne also reported during the election campaign that ‘Key’s chief press secretary Kevin Taylor pulled his boss out of a planned Q&A interview with the Herald on Sunday’ (Milne 2011). Whitworth concluded that ‘Key doesn’t respect the media, and wants to have his cake and to eat it too. He wants the media for all his photo-ops and baby-kissing but then stonewalls when asked – repeatedly – for serious debate’ (Whitworth 2011).
At election time, the major party leaders appear to be increasingly reluctant to appear in televised leaders’ debates. Such events have become a central part of the campaign, but the number of debates has been steadily declining – from seven in 2002 to only three in 2011.
New Zealand politicians have taken different approaches to dealing with what they regard as aggressive journalists, but an increasingly common approach is to return the aggression. This has been an ongoing theme in modern New Zealand politics. For example, in 1980, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon took offence at the line of questioning from the Listener’s Tom Scott at a post-cabinet press conference, first refusing to answer Scott’s questions and then telling his staff: ‘Take him away will you?’ Then in 1985, former politician Bob Jones punched and broke TVNZ reporter Rob Vaughan’s nose after Jones was pursued for comment about his New Zealand Party. More recently, in 2002 Prime Minister Helen Clark dealt with hostile and unexpected questioning from TV3’s John Campbell about genetically modified food allegations by challenging his ethics and later labelling him ‘a little creep’. Clark also took a case to the Broadcasting Standards Authority – again, an increasingly common response by politicians to television and radio reporting. Politicians also make complaints to the Press Council about their adverse coverage in newspapers.
A further example of a politician’s aggressive anti-media approach occurred during the 2011 general election when Prime Minister John Key laid a complaint with the police about his treatment by the media – a saga that became the defining issue of the campaign. The controversy came out of a media photo-opportunity in which the prime minister met with ACT candidate John Banks. The meeting, to which media were invited, took place in a café in the Auckland electorate of Epsom, and was an attempt by National to signal an implicit endorsement of ACT’s Epsom candidate. The ACT Party – a National coalition partner – was facing electoral defeat unless it could win at least one electorate. National sought to save its partner by sending a message to National voters to vote, not for the National candidate, but for John Banks.
There was already heightened public and media interest in the issue, with some obvious distaste for such endorsements. But the event, which occurred two weeks before polling day, became more significant when it was revealed that a freelance cameraman, Bradley Ambrose, had covertly recorded the two politicians’ conversation. Ambrose claimed that the audio recording had been made unintentionally. Along with other members of the media, he had been invited to record the politicians’ initial meeting in the café. But when all journalists were ushered out, Ambrose claimed he was prevented from being able to remove his microphone from the café table, and it was only after the event that he discovered it had recorded the whole conversation. He took the recording to the Herald on Sunday newspaper, which chose not to publish it.
John Key laid a complaint with the police and publicly condemned what he called ‘News of the World style tactics’. He described the issue as ‘the start of a slippery slope’, and from this point his relationship with the media became decidedly colder. The police issued search warrants for a number of media outlets, and carried out an investigation. In the meantime, various details of the recording leaked out, fuelling interest in the New Zealand First party and its leader Winston Peters, who claimed that the prime minister had made derogatory remarks about his supporters. Many commentators credit the scandal for helping New Zealand First make its successful comeback at the election, and arguably reducing the National vote. Observers also credit the ‘teapot tape’ controversy as marking a significant break in government-media relations. The saga is important in illustrating the sometimes tense relationship between media and politicians, and how both sides can use aggressive tactics against the other.
The impact of professionalisation
The emergence of party professionals as a powerful force within New Zealand politics has had important consequences. The ‘PR-isation’ has significantly changed political parties, elections and public debate. To varying extents, the new-found power of party professionals has shifted influence away from party members and activists, party bureaucrats, political journalists and even the elected politicians themselves. Now there is a constant struggle for dominance – not just between politicians and the media but also between journalists, politicians and party professionals.
Some party professionals have extraordinary degrees of influence within parties. As Laugesen has pointed out, this differentiates modern party professionals from traditional party workers. Therefore, although not necessarily household names, professionals behind the scenes of many parties are becoming acknowledged as important players in the parties’ directions and operations.
These professionals clearly have a lot of influence over policy. For instance, Laugesen has outlined how during the 1990s Labour Research Unit executive director Heather Simpson not only oversaw Labour’s policy but wrote ‘most of it herself with input from shadow spokespeople and more junior staff members’ (Laugesen 1996, p.13).
The growing professionalisation of parties is also disturbing the balance of power that exists between them and the media. According to Steve Maharey, ‘Politicians are operating in a more sophisticated way and with more resources at a time when journalists are stretching to do even a basic job’ (Maharey 1992, p.96). Media professionals employed by the political parties in Parliament now outnumber those employed as journalists in the parliamentary press gallery. By 1998, 48 media professionals worked for all the parties and 45 journalists worked in the gallery.
This has had a major impact on the ideological nature of party politics. In most situations the PR-isation of politics has led to ‘bland-isation’. The professionals do not have the same ideological objectives as traditional party actors, and instead have a focus that is intrinsically less ideological. After all, the spin doctors employed by politicians are not party activists but essentially ‘guns for hire’. The ex-journalists are often from the parliamentary press gallery. As noted earlier, in 1995 the Evening Post’s Mike Munro swapped sides to work for Helen Clark. As an illustration of the fact that the parties are not terribly concerned with the politics of the professionals they hire, Munro pointed out that before being hired by the leader, ‘Clark didn’t even ask me if I was a member of the Labour Party’ (quoted in Clifton 1997, p.29). Likewise, John Goulter, former Evening Post political editor, joined the National prime minister’s staff in January 1999, and was reported as insisting ‘that at no time has anyone asked him who he votes for’ (Johns 1999, p.65). When journalist John Tulloch applied for a press secretary job with Phil Goff, he says, ‘I told Phil that though I’m not a screaming right-winger, my politics are not necessarily aligned with Labour. He saw that as an advantage. He thought going into the job as a cheerleader [for Labour] could have problems’ (Coddington 2001, p.69).
The career focus of such professionals means they are primarily concerned with the narrow task of winning elections. This involves a de-emphasising of policy, principles and ideology. Much of this is achieved by the use of survey research techniques – especially focus groups and opinion polling. One media trainer, Brian Edwards (2011), has lamented the role of survey research in politics, and shown its consequences:
As someone who has given media advice to several candidates for the highest office in the land, including David Lange and Helen Clark, I have had the opportunity to observe at close range the influence which focus group research has over policy and decision-making, particularly during election campaigns. And all too often it has stuck in my craw…. [Politicians] were dissuaded from promoting policies which they strongly believed in and knew to be right, because the focus group research showed that to promote those policies might lose them votes. Rather than attempting to change people’s minds, the easier option of underplaying or simply not articulating the unpopular policy was taken. Leadership gave way to followship, principle to cynical pragmatism.
In 2010, National Business Review journalist Matt Nippert wrote an article entitled ‘Panic Station: Policy quashing on the ninth floor of the Beehive’, which sought to examine the influential advisers in John Key’s office. Nippert explained the role of Key’s spin doctors in trying to keep the government from veering into anything too radical or unpopular. He outlined the ‘steady stream of quashed and heavily-diluted policies’ that the risk-averse spin doctors have been responsible for. Key’s chief press secretary, Kevin Taylor, was seen as the most cautious of the lot according to Nippert – hence his moniker of ‘Captain Panic Pants’, as he was apparently known within the government. Nippert painted a picture of party professionals who ‘value popularity over policy’ (2010).
Politicians’ relations with the media
The media’s relationship with politicians is extremely problematic in New Zealand. In most areas journalists are in a weakened position vis-a-vis political parties, MPs and government. Parliamentarians are so well-resourced that the media is at a huge disadvantage in covering politics. Parties in Parliament have access to multi-million-dollar funding from Parliamentary Service and Ministerial Services that they use for what amounts to constant election campaigning.
As a result, the public rarely gets to see what goes on behind the scenes in politics. Instead they are fed a constant stream of scripted campaigning, meaning the public is often ill-served and ill-informed. The 2011 election was one of the most heavily manipulated and glossy that New Zealand has experienced. One journalist described what it was like to follow the politicians around, and how much journalists rely on a stage-managed diary of political walkabouts without any real content to report on:
One day is starting to look a lot like the rest. Journalists fret over their laptops each night trying desperately to conjure up ‘colour’ – how do you turn John Key eating a prawn into news? – and wake to a new day of shopping centre walkabouts, kindy visits and factory tours. The lack of interesting news is in inverse proportion to the amount of energy, planning and resources poured into each day on the campaign trail. Advance teams from the leader's office head up the night before to scope out the territory, check for potential pratfalls and ensure nothing is left to chance. In National's case, the purpose is not to create news, but manage it. Prime Minister John Key is so far ahead right now that no news – literally – is good news (Watkins 2011).
It is in the role of prime minister that we see the PR-isation dynamic most clearly at play. Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark was one of the most media-active prime ministers New Zealand has ever seen, spending considerable energy cultivating relationships with journalists and making herself available to the media for interviews and briefings. Her successor, John Key, also had an excellent mastery of the media. As prime minister and leader, Key was National’s greatest electoral asset, enjoying very high levels of personal popularity. Detractors mocked what they called his superficial ‘smile and wave’ routine in response to every issue, but Key’s command of the photo-opportunity was impressive. Not only did he take advantage of every opportunity to meet with royalty, entertainment and sports stars, he continued to exude a down-to-earth common touch that some voters may have found endearing. However, his relationship with the media was significantly eroded by the ‘teapot tape’ scandal of 2011.
Conclusion
The 2011 New Zealand general election was widely regarded as the most heavily stage-managed in living memory. Politicians and parties were extremely cautious, sticking to photo opportunities, publicity stunts and allowing little meaningful debate to occur. Designer politics, with its market research, spin doctors and sound bites, made the parties all appear the same. Unsurprisingly, the voter turnout for the election was the lowest in over a century – only 69.57 percent of the eligible population. Perhaps connectedly, the defining moment of the campaign was the heavily stage-managed photo-opportunity between Prime Minister John Key and ACT candidate John Banks, which led to a vicious stoush between politicians and the media.
Politicians and the media have for a long time had a symbiotic relationship. But the rise of the party professional – the ‘spin doctor’ in particular – has made that relationship even more complicated. There is now an extra dimension in the ongoing struggle for dominance. The media will continue to be the main arena in which New Zealand politicians carry out their daily work, but the ‘PR-isation’ of politics means it often has a less meaningful nature. The more challenging and difficult terrains of the media landscape are effectively by-passed by smart techniques, and party professionals largely achieve their goals of keeping politics and politicians on-message, bland and safe.
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