Part of the explanation for the disconnection between political parties and third parties such as interest groups or pressure groups can also be found in the rise of anti-interest group ideology in the 1980s and the subsequent marginalisation of groups representing various class interests. [Read more below]
Prior to the dramatic changes in governance in the mid-1980s governments and parties ‘would be influenced in their actions by their party memberships and by the lobbying of pressure groups. Both provided a mechanism linking the government with the elector’ (Jesson, 1989d). In this previous era of ‘corporatism’, certain interest groups were recognised by the state to be the legal representatives of the economic or social sectors they came from. This framework increased the relationship between interest groups and political parties. During the 1950s and 1960s especially, this relationship was fostered by the ability of governments to distribute patronage to their support groups. Naturally both National and Labour set up a whole range of subsidies, protective devices and incentive schemes to benefit farmers, local manufacturers, unionists and so forth. Through their connections with political parties, interest groups therefore often became part of ‘the Establishment’ (Jackson, 1973: p.94).
As pointed out in earlier blog posts on third parties, aligned groups like Federated Farmers and the Federation of Labour came to be represented on a large number of quangos. Thus the leaders of both National and Labour often consulted more with interest groups than they did with their own party members. Political scientist Gwendolen Carter argued in 1956, ‘As is true of the Labor party in New Zealand, the parliamentary leader [of National] frequently consults more with powerful nonparty interest groups, e.g., representatives of the Manufacters’ Federation and other business interests, than with members of his party organization’ (Carter, 1956: p.99). Even if no consultation took place, parties and governments would at least make their policy decisions with interest group reactions in mind. Jackson, writing in 1973 gave the example of internal government decisions like Cabinet allocations: ‘Even today, any government making an appointment to the post of Minister of Defence, for example, will carefully bear in mind the likely receptions of such a nominee by the Returned Services’ Association’ (Jackson, 1973: p.93).
In the 1980s the Fourth Labour Government dramatically changed this relationship, adopting an anti-interest group stance and refusing to listen to or involve interest groups in the decision making process. This principle related to the public choice theory model of governance: ‘Building on an influential public-choice analysis of interest-group politics, the model depicts interest groups as self-interested "vested" interests seeking special advantages or "privileges" for themselves which are contrary to the public interest’ (Mulgan, 1997a: p.212). Tenbensel argues that, ‘since 1984, New Zealand’s political elite have taken on board the view that the role of interest groups in the political process should be minimalised. They have instituted a range of reforms that have quite clearly reduced and constrained the political space within which interest groups can operate’ (Tenbensel, 2001: p.329).
Crucially, however, Mulgan has also pointed out that although interest groups have lost their influence with governments, ‘Employers and business leaders, on the other hand, have retained their rights of access regardless of the party in power. Their support is critical to the overall performance of the economy on which any government’s popularity depends’ (Mulgan, 1997a: p.224). Mulgan says that, ‘Interest group activity and influence, however, was not so much reduced as displaced (Mulgan 1994, 215). Groups that could not gain easy access to ministers as of right turned increasingly to the burgeoning firms of public relations consultants for help in getting their message through, via media publicity or informal contacts. New organisations emerged which were more attuned to the new discourse of the public interest’ (Mulgan, 1995: pp.91-92; See also: Vowles, 1992a: p.355; and Jesson, 1992c).
The recent increase in the regulation of political parties has also tended to inhibit the linkages between parties and interest groups. For example, the requirement of political parties to disclose any large donations received means that the financial relationship between parties and other organisations is discouraged, due to the disincentive of negative publicity. Furthermore, the Electoral Act inhibits aligned groups from carrying out television advertising campaigns in support of their preferred party during an election campaign. A good example of the problematic arrangement was the refusal during the 1999 general election campaign of the Television Commercials Advisory Board (TVCAB) to allow the screening of an advertising campaign by the Engineers Union that called on voters to change the government.
Similarly, it is likely that the increasing state resourcing of political parties is also having a crucial impact on the parties and their relationships with other organisations in civil society (see blog posts on political finance). By providing resources that are substitutable for those resources formerly provided by private benefactors, the state provides a disincentive for the parties to expand and develop their relationships with societal organisations.
The increasingly close relationship with the state – built on resources and regulations – is changing the orientation of political parties to societal groups. Parties have formerly regarded themselves as being societal organisations rather than public ones. The distinction is important – a societal institution is one that is part of civil society and obviously partisan, whilst a public one is something of a governmental one above civil society. It follows on from this that ‘public’ political parties should not be aligned to organised interests in society. By being aligned to trade unions or business organisations, modern political parties are seen as being sectarian or biased towards a particular group in society rather than being interested in the ‘public good’ as a whole. In this sense, all the New Zealand parties are increasingly ‘national’ parties – as the National Party was originally conceived. Therefore nearly all political parties now purport to exist and operate to further the interests of all voters and social groups. To align a political party with any organised societal institution is to be seen as being in contradiction to the new consensus of ‘classlessness’.