Nowadays many so-called third parties prefer not to associate themselves with a particular political party, but instead seek to develop relationships with government departments. And likewise, some political parties are developing closer relationships with particular government agencies. [Read more below]
Tim Tenbensel has pointed out that such relationships are potentially more beneficial for the interest groups because of the durability of a relationship with the more permanent institutions of the state:
An example of such a relationship with a government agency is that of alcohol industry groups and the Ministry of Commerce. Anti-alcohol campaigners, on the other hand, will focus their attention on building alliances with the Ministry of Health (Tenbensel, 2001: pp.323-324).
Likewise, the anti-smoking group Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) is allegedly ‘funded by taxpayers to lobby government to introduce anti-smoking laws’ (Coddington, 2001: p.63). Similarly, the pro-logging citizens of the South Island West Coast allegedly used the resources and expertise of state-owned enterprise Timberlands West Coast to establish the pressure group Coast Action Network (Hager, 1999). Among other partisan activities, the Network paid for full-page advertisements in the Coromandel electorate attacking the Green, Labour and Alliance parties. In this way the interest groups are building up relationships with organs of the state in lieu of political parties.
Similarly, political parties are increasingly substituting their relationships with interest groups with state institutions. It is obvious that when in government, political parties have the ability to establish, mould or develop state institutions in a way that creates institutional support for the party. One of the ways that parties in government do this is through political patronage. There are many examples of parties appointing sympathetic people (and even party members) to state institutions, thus making those institutions more in tune with that party (See: Jackson, 1973: p.193; James, 1987a: p.33; and Colin Espiner, 2003b; 2003d).
For example, in 2001 the media speculated about links between CCMAU and Act after a number of CCMAU documents critical of government policies were released by the party. The leaks resulted in the Deputy Prime Minister saying he could no longer trust CCMAU staff, and the Prime Minister calling CCMAU a ‘chronic leaker’ and saying ministers would curtail their dealings with the agency (quoted in Armstrong et al., 2001).
As an example of the Reserve Bank’s close connection with the National Party, Don Brash, the bank’s governor since 1988, resigned in 2002 and stood successfully as candidate for National.
It would be surprising if there was not a higher than average support for the Green Party in DOC. According to Jesson, the department ‘is staffed by people with a history of support for conservation causes’ (Jesson, 1972: p.373). In 2001 the Greens negotiated the Eco-2001 package with the Labour-Alliance Government in return for the party’s support of the government. The package increased funding for DOC and the Ministry of the Environment.
Jim Anderton has remodelled the Ministry of Commerce into the Ministry of Economic Development, and this agency has become an important source of political and bureaucratic support for Anderton and his party. Two seconded staff from the ministry are employed in Anderton’s ministerial office.
This is an area that warrants further research.
