This is a paper I gave to the Australasian Political Studies Association conference in Christchurch, 1998
Abstract: New Zealand parliamentary politics has, in recent years, entered a new political cycle characterised by party fragmentation, the dominance of personalities, and a focus on trivial issues. Volatility and fluidity are the order of the day. The parties themselves lack any real dynamism. Moreover they are characterised by a policy convergence and an ideological exhaustion - in the sense that there has been a tendency for all parties to not only move towards the centre of the political spectrum, but also to place less emphasis on their ideological component. Subsequently, the new cycle of party politics can be characterised as a “politics without policies”. More than ever before pragmatism and electoral calculations shape political culture and politics can no longer be understood by the traditional concepts such as left and right. This paper seeks to find explanations for this strange state of affairs. It posits that while the shift to MMP may have accelerated the disintegration of mainstream politics, a number of other interconnected influences have combined to bring about the current state of political parties. The most obvious one is that two decades of economic slump and social decay has undermined the possibility of any of the current parties being able to provide anything of substance. A further explanation for the present impasse of the parties can be found in the effect of the ending of the Cold War, which has unleashed a crisis of legitimacy for the political institutions of Western society. The increasing blandness of political parties can also, in part, be attributed to the suspension of collective conflict between workers and the employers and authorities in the 1990s. With class conflict suspended, the parties lack the class anchors that once provided parties with ideological stability and direction. Essentially then, this party political fragmentation and malaise reflects deeper socio-economic trends.
Introduction
All over the Western world, political parties are in a state of transformation, decay and crisis. Since the 1970s, but especially during the 1990s, party systems have been in upheaval, with new parties rising and falling overnight, and with more established parties facing crises of organisation, identity and credibility.[1] General elections in the 1990s have marked a new era in which political allegiances have become more volatile, as there are often sudden shifts and fluctuations in the fortunes of politicians and parties. In general, there is a certain disorientation, turbulence and unpredictability in the political arena.
This decline of political parties is reflected in the academic study of them, which has been marked by a mood of pessimism. Academics everywhere in the Western democracies have noted that the old political order is falling apart, and in particular, the traditional institution of the party is one of the main victims (Berman 1997, 101).[2]
New Zealand’s party system is, of course, a prime example of this international trend, as its long-standing alignments are in the process of being severely altered. Furthermore, in recent years the mainstream parties have been facing ‘a crisis of ideology, leadership, organisation, membership and funding’ (Kelsey 1993, 154). The exhausted state of party politics is also indicated by the declining vote for traditional parties,[3] voter volatility,[4] voter confusion,[5] a decline in the public’s trust of the parties,[6] and a decline in voter turnout.[7] The haemorrhaging of parties’ memberships is also indicative of the decay of party politics.[8]
New Zealand party politics has entered what might be called a new political cycle. This cycle is characterised most of all by the convergence of policy, party fragmentation, voter volatility, an increase in trivial and individual politics, and the exhaustion of ideology and principle. This phase has been underway for some years, but with the introduction of MMP, this disintegration and moderation of traditional mainstream politics has only been accelerated.
It seems that although 1960s intellectuals might have been premature in their heralding of the “end of ideology” in politics, such a theory of convergence is now a reality in New Zealand and international politics. This ideological transformation of party politics is apparent in two ways. Firstly, there is an ideological convergence in the sense that there has been a movement by the parties towards the centre of the political spectrum; and secondly there has been a general exhaustion of ideology, in that principle and philosophy are less central to the operations and nature of the parties.
The Rush to the Centre
One of the most important aspects of this new political cycle is the ideological and policy convergence of the main parties. By international standards, political scientists have for a long time regarded the New Zealand party system as a typical case of party convergence, rather than polarisation. However this could be said to have changed during the 1980s and early 1990s. In this period the most influential New Zealand political leaders were ideologues like Roger Douglas and Ruth Richardson. Since then, however, the more pragmatic figures of Bolger, Clark and Peters have dominated.[9] The burst of radical reforming zeal of the 1980s and early 1990s has clearly given way to centrist pragmatism in the mid-to-late 1990s.
The shift by New Zealand’s political parties towards the centre of the political spectrum is made clear by the fact that there is now a real lack of significant disagreement from the parties on policy fundamentals, as the parties all share similar principles and assumptions. Between them, the parties now have more in common than they have differences.[10] Consequently, and contrary to popular belief, none are espousing anything radical. More than ever before, the parties all claim to represent the true orthodoxy.
The 1996 general election showed that there were few significant issues that separated the two main parties. The content of the election manifestos of Labour and National revealed that they were now in broad agreement on all the major economic issues. Basically they both believed in: free trade, free enterprise, mild interventionism, the Reserve Bank Act, low taxation, debt repayment, leaner government, balanced budgets, and to a lesser extent the current industrial relations legislation.[11] Even on non-economic issues, the parties were never too far apart; in particular they had similar policies on immigration, law and order, education, race relations, the environment and foreign policy.[12]
Politicians of the two parties have therefore had great difficulty during the 1990s in asserting what is distinct about their particular party.[13] This has been reflected in public opinion polls which have illustrated a belief in that in the early 1990s there was little difference between Labour and National.[14]
The similarities of the three highest polling parties in the 1996 general election meant that in reality it made little difference which of them formed the first MMP government. Comparing the two competing coalition agreements that NZ First had negotiated with both National and Labour, Fiona Barker found that there was ‘a high degree of convergence’ between the two of them which indicated the ‘reasonably close positioning of the three parties in the centre of the political spectrum' (Barker 1998, 253).
Even the Alliance and Act – parties who supposedly pitch themselves to people of principle and conviction rather than to the middle ground – have also been moving fast towards the centre, moderating their programmes. If one believed their publicity, then in the lead up to the last election it seemed that both these “parties of principle” were set to be the major beneficiaries of the change to MMP and that they would insert more principle back into parliamentary politics. After all, political scientists and MMP campaigners told us that under the old First-Past-the-Post electoral system the chase for the undecided voter in the marginal electorates meant the two parties converged, whereas under MMP the party vote could be used effectively by voters with conviction and principle.[15] Act’s Rodney Hide claimed, ‘Capturing the party vote will mean standing for something a little stronger than “getting it right” or “keeping things ticking”... The interesting change is that where the power used to be in the centre (with the floater), it has now shifted to the edges’ (Hide 1996, 12). This has proved to be resoundingly untrue, with these so-called parties of principles getting only 16% of the vote between them in the 1996 general election.
In particular, it is on economic issues that the political parties are heading towards a consensus. New right economic policy is the order of the day. Basically, all the parties in Parliament accept the on-going economic realities, including tight controls on government expenditure[16] and the continuation of mass unemployment.[17] Some parties, such as the Alliance and Act, may promise to make radical changes, but in reality their programmes of reform amount to mere adjustments to the new economic framework.[18] Essentially, the economic policies dividing left and right have been reduced to that of proposing a fraction more or a fraction less government intervention, ownership, and taxation.
Act was originally formed to promote hard-line “new right” principles such as zero income tax and a minimalist state. It had an “ideological” leader in Roger Douglas but little support in the polls. Richard Prebble, upon becoming leader in 1995, redefined Act as a supposed mainstream party of “middle NZ”. Among other adaptations Act dropped its “no income tax” pledge in favour of a flat 19.5 per cent tax. In a major piece of re-positioning, Act's hard edges have been blurred and its detailed policy statements have been converted instead into “values”.[19] Today the party is primarily associated with populist campaigns such as “perk busting”. Act now tends to emphasise its role in contributing to “stability” rather than “change”.[20]
The Alliance likewise (and its constituent parties) has been subject to moderating forces since its very formation. Early on the party shifted its emphasis away from that of a policy-orientation to that of a process-orientation. The
Alliance pushed itself as representing a new more accountable ‘consensual, cooperative, coalition politics’ (James 1994b, 17). At the height of the anti-First-Past-the-Post era they were thus rewarded with very high poll ratings. In terms of policy moderation too, the party has traveled a long distance in a short period of time. The asset buy-back policy has been considerably toned down, its planned government expenditure downsized, and recently the Alliance has moved to sacrifice one of its main points of difference from Labour by signaling that it is prepared to moderate its tax policies. Likewise, with the recent release of its new monetary policy, the Alliance is legitimately claiming a new economic “respectability”.[21]
The short history of New Zealand First provides, of course, the most dramatic example of a party rushing to moderate its political “brand”. In the lead up to the last election the party brought its more “radical” policies in line with the expected “realities” of governing (Laws 1998, 323-329). While NZ First could initially be described as populist and nationalist, and at times perhaps even left of centre, it now aspires to occupy the centre-right of politics. In fact before the party split from “the Coalition”, NZ First subscribed to the main directions of social and economic policy that had been established by the previous Labour and National governments.
Therefore today it seems that – despite MMP – there is little difference between the parties on all of the big issues. This situation further dispels the idea that an intensification of party competition increases the political choice available to voters and that it ideologically revitalizes politics (Parenti 1983, 201-202). Instead voters are now being offered similar political projects – only they are packaged in the form of a fragmented party system.
In fact, the differences between the parties probably appear bigger than they actually are. This is largely because the differences are ‘magnified by partisan rhetoric’ (Parenti 1983, 202). Much like other commodified products in the marketplace the parties have to have their differences exaggerated. Therefore the very absence of real political differences makes it all the more necessary for the parties to stress the ideological differences – or at least the ideological symbolism – that differentiates them from other parties.
However at the same time it would not be accurate to characterise the parties in Parliament as being totally the same. The parties still rely, to some degree on their traditional blocs of class and other societal variations, and therefore require some obvious or manufactured differences between them to continue to reinforce past loyalties. However, the question that needs to be asked is: Are these differences of any significant consequence? Or are the similarities of more importance than the differences?
The Exhaustion of Ideology
While conflict between the political parties does indeed still exist, it is not often conflict that is driven by political principle but more often conflict driven by pragmatism or electoral calculation.[22] This is a sign that parliamentary parties in New Zealand are not only characterised by an ideological convergence, but also by an ideological exhaustion – a situation in which the ideological component of the party is less important or prominent.[23]
New Zealand parties have become the ultimate “catch-all” organisations, watering down their policies in order to offend the fewest voters. In their quest to occupy the mushy centre ground, they have become less political and programmatical. This could be termed the “Americanisation of New Zealand politics”, as the parties come to look more and more like those in the US.
In the absence of ideology, then, there is a corresponding lack of policies of any substance being produced –none of the parties have much of interest to say anymore. This has been reflected most strongly in recent election campaigns which have clearly been less about manifestos, programmes and policy, and more about leadership and trivialities.[24]
The 1996 general election, for instance, was the perfect illustration of just how unimportant ideas are in politics, as the parties’ policies played very little role in the election campaigns or debates. For example, there was no substantial debate about issues of defense, race relations, foreign affairs, law and order or the environment – let alone any clash between alternative visions of society.[25] Most of the parties’ election manifestos were more concerned to propagate platitudes rather than policies (Speden 1995, 18).[26]
A classic example of the move away from ideological and policy-based politics was that of Act’s 1996 campaign based around the slogan “Values, not Politics”.[27] This illustrates the increasing trend of all the parties to campaign by propagating vague middle-of-the-road values rather than actually bothering with any real policy detail.
What is made most obvious by the increasing ideological void in the parties, is the absence of any “big issues” on the political agenda. Although New Zealand party politics has always been relatively pragmatic, in the past, ideas have at least appeared more central, questions about the “big issues” have been on the agenda, and so the concepts of left and right have had more meaning than they do today. In the West ‘these conflicts were sometimes banal and superficial, but often they centred on fundamental differences over how society should be run’ (Furedi 1995, 12). Therefore questions were asked about the ownership and control of society's wealth, and the production and allocation of resources. Nowadays no fundamental questions about society are being asked by any of the parties – even the question of unemployment has disappeared from public debate (Furedi 1995, 12).
The decline of ideology goes hand-in-hand with the increasing unpopularity of so-called “extreme” politics. Because the big issues of the past acted as ideological anchors, the result of their absence is that political debate has become somewhat narrower and there is less tolerance of “extremism”. Obviously the new moderation in parliamentary politics means that anything outside the sphere of orthodoxy is painted as extremism. In this new climate there is a tendency for politicians to say nothing rather than risk causing offence. This further propels them towards a politics without policies (Jaensch 1994, 243).[28] As a logical conclusion, all the parties are attempting to market themselves as ‘orthodox’ and as ‘of the centre’ and conversely trying to label their opponents as extreme (Heartfield 1997).[29] Hence, no one wants to be cast in the role of doctrinaire fanatics – even Act, who have been quickly shedding all such symbols or indications of doctrine. Witness also the Alliance in their painstaking attempts to argue that their economic solutions are in fact moderate and conservative, while arguing that National and Act are radical and extreme.[30]
There are some commentators and academics who view the new cycle of politics in a positive light. To them, the ideological convergence of parties equates with the end of deep conflict and thus indicates the resolution of problems for which society originally required such ideological conflict. Likewise, the reorientation towards the centre might suggest to some that “common sense” now drives politics – in that the ruling out of extremes has now produced a sensible “middle way”. This is a ‘positive value judgement’ – that we have reached “the good society" – that there is nothing left to become ideological about (Jaensch 1994, 227).[31] Commentating in 1997 on the international “end of ideology”, political party expert Peter Mair asserted that:
many of the great issues which once sustained traditional loyalties have now more or less been solved. The struggles of the working class for political rights have been won; the legitimacy of defending the rights of organized religion has also been accepted, as has the legitimacy of the rights of those who reject religious beliefs; a comprehensive welfare state has become the norm in most of the contemporary west European democracies, and such conflicts over welfare rights as do persist tend to be at the margins of the system. The great struggles are over…(Mair 1997, 38-39).
This sort of statement is reminiscent of the post-war consensus of the 1950s and 60s, which was also misread as indicating an end-state of harmony and the belief that popular satisfaction was being achieved. SM Lipset wrote at the time: 'This change in Western political life reflects the fact that the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; [and] the conservatives have accepted the welfare state' (SM Lipset 1963, 442-443).
There are, however, some very important differences between the “end of ideology” situation in the 1950s and 60s and that of the 1990s. During the fifties and sixties, both National and Labour accepted what could be called a ‘positive consensus’ around welfare capitalism and the goal of equity. Today’s strong convergence of views is by contrast a ‘common negativity’ – a defensive consensus based around resigned acceptance of the low horizons imposed on society by an economically exhausted system (Furedi 1995, 12). So while in the postwar situation the ideological conformity was produced by optimism, affluence and a forward momentum, now the ideological void is produced by a lack of affluence and the lowered horizons that are driving the new cycle of politics.
This lack of “big issues” and the lack of ideological debate on the political agenda is not because the practical issues and problems no longer exist. The opposite is the case, with the 1990s being characterised by intractable social and economic problems: high unemployment, on-going economic instability and slump, social dislocation and exclusion, growing inequality between rich and poor and between Maori and Pakeha, and so on. It seems that the parties have, in effect, accepted defeat on such issues and therefore have precious little to say about the big issues changing our society.
Increasing Trivia and Fragmentation
The new cycle of party politics is characterised, also, by a predominance of ‘scandals, defections and in-fighting’ (Warren 1997, 4). Instead of the wider issues being up for debate, the current Parliament has been preoccupied with tax cuts, retirement savings, politicians’ perks, or what should be done with government buildings. This increase in trivial politics – often erroneously attributed to MMP – is better understood within the context of the ideological convergence and exhaustion of party politics. Obviously in the absence of any real principle, policies or meaningful debate, other more trivial issues come to the fore; without proper policies to campaign and compete on, and without plausible solutions to today’s problems, parliamentary politics has transformed further into a ‘circus’ than ever before (Jones 1997b; Laugesen 1997).[32] The narrowing of the political therefore also means its trivialisation.
The fractionalisation of all the parties in parliament illustrates the decline of ideology and principle in New Zealand politics in that these breakdowns have so little to do with ideological principles – the party splits and debates usually contain little substance. These splits therefore also indicate a general ‘internal weakness rather than a dynamic political struggle’ going on (Richards 1992).
In line with party fragmentation, individuals or coalitions of individuals are often emerging as the key players, quite separately from their parties. Hence, we have the spectacle of high-profile maverick individuals such as Neil Kirton, Tau Henare and Christine Fletcher all dominating political debate. The actual political parties and their extra-parliamentary organisations and memberships are now less central.[33]
Instead of coherent parties organised around programmes, political life is becoming a contest between personalities, cliques and factions that stand for little. For example, it is difficult to believe that Mike Moore, Alamein Kopu or Deborah Morris stand for anything much more than themselves.[34] It seems that the weakening and incoherence of the old parties means that the conflict between them no longer structures mainstream politics, and instead it is the trivial issues and personalities of individuals that matter most.
Today’s party politics is highly characterised by fluidity and unpredictability. Without the coherence of ideology, political policies are unstable, irregular, and fast changing. This is partly because the policy-making processes are now firmly in the hands of the parliamentary wings of the parties – who make it up as they go along. What is deemed to be unpopular is quickly and quietly modified. Quite simply, because the parties are not firmly anchored in any principles their policies are prone to dramatic changes overnight.
Most obviously of all in the new cycle of politics, politicians and parties now lack any policy dynamism. While parties of the left have largely given up on their traditional visions and policies, and have arrived at an accommodation with market capitalism,[35] the left has yet to construct any new framework of big ideas with which to move forward.[36] It needs to be pointed out though, that it is not just left-wing ideas which appear to lack relevance today, but also right-wing ones. The dynamic Rogernomics and Ruthenusia crusades have passed and the once confident right-wing agenda is exhausted. The National Party has now been in search of self-definition for over a decade and is failing to come up with any new "big idea" or coherent party identity. The party inspires few as it has lost steam as a party of change (James 1997a). Act, too, is having trouble selling its libertarian policies and is now attempting to expand its appeal from that of an “ideas party” of economic and social liberalism to a more pragmatic and almost rural-orientated party of populist protest and social conservatism. It seems that the freemarket project no longer provides confidence for the right and this is reflected in the failure of the parties of the right to project any positive view of the future.
Economic Changes
There is a sense in which the political impasse in this country is merely matching the economic impasse that has existed for some time. The exhausted state of party politics reflects the huge effect of two decades of economic slump and social decay, and the fact that a declining and exhausted capitalist economy can have little to offer society.
Therefore the basis for the strange state of New Zealand party politics can in part be located in the shortcomings of the capitalist system. Because all the parliamentary parties aspire to manage the affairs of capitalism, they must, in the words of Tessa Myers (1997), ‘tailor their programmes to suit what is possible under that system. Their options are always constrained by the fact that the economy exists to make private profits for capitalists. When profits are flowing, governments can sometimes afford more adventurous initiatives. But the reverse also applies’ (Myers 1997). The declining health of the economy means that the parties are less able to make promises of much substance or initiative. [37]
Another problem of the intractable economic crisis is that there is an absence of any plausible ideas about how to deal with it. The parties of government are therefore driven into trivialities and consensus by the simple fact that they are unable to provide solutions for the underlying economic problems. Even the opposition parties have no real solutions to the current problems – as the on-going slump has disproved all mainstream economic theories. Both new-right and old-Keynesian economic policies are now exhausted. As a result little debate occurs about economics (Jones, 1997a).
The Ending of the Cold War
The 1990s are often described as a time of ‘worldwide turmoil and uncertainty’ - as Queen Elizabeth II put it in her 1991 Christmas Day speech to the Commonwealth. Never before have the institutions of the establishment faced such a crisis of confidence. This international situation therefore makes the impact of the economic crisis all the more serious on the political system.
As well as the economic malaise, the ending of the Cold War has thrown the old world order into disarray – unleashing a general crisis of legitimacy. It is becoming increasingly recognised that Cold War politics strongly shaped the ideological and institutional framework of Western politics, and therefore played a strong role in structuring Western party politics.[38] As Ware has argued:
cold war issues did divide parties of both left and right, often in quite subtle ways, and helped to shape the context in which they competed and cooperated with each other. These issues helped to anchor party positions and strategies, in relation to each other, in a whole variety of ways. Remove an anchor and underlying currents will have a rather different effect on the objects they were once holding (Ware 1995, 324-325).
The external threat of the Cold War gave the left and right concepts some meaning, through both cohering New Zealand society and creating dividing lines within NZ politics. The ending of the Cold War has meant the loss of the propaganda focus that gave the right cohesion throughout the Cold War era, and for further discredited the “state socialist” policies associated with the left.
Changes in the Class Nature of Society
This new cycle of party politics is, in a sense, also matching the social fragmentation which shapes New Zealand society today. Changes in the social structure of any country have a serious influence on the political system, as transformations in the character and relationships of the various social groupings translate into political life through their interaction with and support for political parties.[39]
Many writers have commented on the decline in the political significance of class in New Zealand society – generally meaning that the class cleavage plays a much reduced role in cohering the activities and configurations of the party system.[40] In today’s fragmented society, where many of the old social constituencies have disintegrated, there is a social process underway producing an individualisation of political life. This is a situation in which people – regardless of their objective social class – think and act more as individuals than as members of a group or class.[41]
While the New Zealand party system was historically based on the class cleavage this is becoming less and less the case. It is quite clear today that the relationship between social classes and political parties is particularly unstable. Traditionally, the National Party is said to be the party of business, farming and the middle class, while the Labour Party that of the working class.[42] This has now changed, with each party attempting to reach out beyond their traditional and typical support bases.[43]
The links between class and party are now weaker than ever, and this is made obvious by the decline in class voting in
New Zealand. Whenever Alford's "index of class voting” has been applied to the New Zealand case it has emphasised the change.[44] On the basis of this, Vowles has argued that the ‘relationship between structural influences and political parties in New Zealand is complex, and weaker than many sociologists might expect’ (Vowles 1994, 191). Likewise recent trends, according to Gold, indicate that ‘social differences do influence party choices in New Zealand, but only to a fairly modest degree’ (Gold 1992, 489). Davidson also wrote, in the late 1980s, that ‘one standard party choice predictor, household income, shows little or no correlation with party choice in the 1987 New Zealand elections. Blue-collar and white-collar workers divided fairly evenly between National and Labour’ (Davidson 1989, 346).[45]
The 1996 general election provided further evidence of the declining relevance of class in party politics. For instance, in his study of voter behaviour in the election, Vowles found that ‘occupational class slightly decreased its influence on voting choices in 1996’ (Vowles 1998, 40). As an example of this, Vowles noted that it was ironic that although the Alliance had been the most explict in its class appeal, they ‘had the most socially undifferentiated voting support’ (Vowles 1998, 45). Also of interest, was McRobie’s voter study, which found strong ‘support for National amongst the semi-skilled and unskilled – over 36 per cent of the party votes and electorate votes cast by electors in the quintile with the most semi-skilled or unskilled people went to National’ (McRobie 1998, 171-172). On the basis of his survey evidence he was also able to confirm that ‘Labour’s transformation from a party of the working class to a party supported by better paid voters... is clearly in evidence’ (McRobie 1998, 173).
The decline in the significance of class is related to the general suspension of class conflict throughout the world. According to British Marxist Frank Furedi, there has been a suspension of collective conflict between workers and the employers and authorities in the 1990s. According to Furedi, mass trade unions were defeated and marginalised during the 1980s, and ‘mass unemployment forced the working class on to the defensive. Perhaps even more importantly, the establishment appeared to win all of the arguments’ (Furedi 1995, 14).[46] But at the same time, he notes, the new right reforms failed to achieve their objectives, and new problems have emerged – the result being a class stalemate.
Most importantly, this suspension of class conflict has resulted in a reduction of pressure on political parties to act on behalf of a particular class. In New Zealand, according to Gold, the weakening of traditional social cleavages means that 'governments can afford to be less sensitive to these differences’ (Gold 1992, 488). For example, ‘policies such as income and wealth redistribution, that have [previously] been pursued in response to group demands or in order to contain group antagonisms, can now be given a lesser priority, since their electoral payoff diminishes once group factors bear less and less on partisanship’ (Gold 1992, 489). According to Furedi, ‘The result is a stalemate where differences between parties seldom have any profound ideological significance’ (Furedi 1995, 14). He suggests that while pragmatic tendencies existed before, only now has ‘the declining influence of class loyalties helped to create a situation in which these tendencies exercise a decisive influence over politics and society’ (Furedi 1995, 14). Quite simply, without a politicised class conflict to encourage rivalry between parties, the parties are allowed to slip into their natural tendency towards ideological convergence (Steward and Ward 1992, 132).
As well as producing convergence, the decline in the salience of social class also produces volatility. This is because, without the presence of class anchors, each party’s programme is more fluidly related to broad attitudes within the community. So for example, the fact that NZ First is so ideologically slippery cannot simply be explained by the opportunism of Winston Peters or the various personalities involved, but should also be seen as a reflection of the party’s unstable and contradictory support base.[47]
Conclusion: A New Cycle of Politics
This paper is largely about party fragmentation and ideological change. It has argued that there are a number of interconnected crises that have combined to produce this new cycle. It has described how an exhausted economic system has interacted with political parties that are committed to that system, and who only have exhausted capitalist economic "solutions" to offer. Other phenomena like the end of the cold war and the changing class relations also contribute to the converging and volatile politics. Together with the erosion of the link between class pressure and party, the rise of the “personality” and issues of trivia, and a “politics without shape” or policies, this has produced an “Americanisation of party politics”.
The unusually fragmented Parliamentary politics and converging political party ideologies might be read as the confirmation of the end of a political era. Certainly it all means that we have left the age where we can understand political parties by the traditional concepts, such as left and right.[48] In the 1990s the left/right divide exists more as a rhetorical device, which is more typically used by the parties for describing their rivals as extreme or as ideological.
The trends in party politics also points to the idea that the old forms of political parties are becoming redundant – that mass parties of left and right are clearly a thing of the past and that we are not about to see them revitalised. It seems that the political ideologies and party organisations of the past cannot be adapted for modern times. They have little capacity to relate to the new cycle of politics. Party politics have clearly moved on and we cannot take anything for granted, and so it is no use looking to the patterns of the past to understand party politics today. Therefore political commentators possibly miss the point in analysing the strange state of New Zealand politics as if the parties are merely in a state of temporary ‘dealignment’ while the parties and their participants regroup and redefine themselves. Such theorists see the state of New Zealand politics as a consequence of studying them at a time when the public are merely transferring their party loyalties. However there is no reason to necessarily believe that solid ties will again form between parties and particular sections of society. Therefore, rather than being seen as just a transitory phase on the way to a new stable alignment, the new political cycle in the New Zealand party system should perhaps be seen as an end-state in itself.[49]
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[1] According to Ware, 'During the first half of the 1990s about one third of the countries which had been governed continuously by liberal democratic regimes since the mid-1950s experienced major electoral upheavals at a general election’ (Ware 1995, 312).
[2] Within the academic literature on political parties, the debates and theses have been dominated by such topics as “the end of ideology”; the development of “catch-all parties”; the "volatility of the parties"; the “dealignment” between voters and parties; the increase in “postmaterial values”; party system "depolarization"; the “voter volatility”; the “beyond left and right” debate; the increase in political apathy; the trivialisation of politics; and the “failure and transformation of socialist and labour parties” (Dogan 1996, 535).
[3] The combined vote for Labour and National has dropped from 99.8% in 1951 to 62% (of the party vote) in 1996.
[4] According to Gamlin ‘of all eligible voters in the last two elections, nearly half (46%) made a different decision in 1996 than they had in 1993’ (Gamlin 1998).
[5] ‘Polls have recorded record numbers of “don’t knows” (up to 45%)’ (James 1993a, 237).
[6] For example, a ‘MRL Research Group Survey conducted during the [1993 election] campaign found that 60 per cent of voters thought that none of the four main parties was honest’ (Vowles, Aimer et al. 1995, 54). See also Banducci and Karp (1997).
[7] While New Zealand used to have a high voter turn-out, often of about 90 per cent, according to James , ‘election turnout has fallen to 78% in 1987 and 76% in 1990 as a percentage of all those of an age to vote’ (James 1993a, 237).
[8] Membership figures provide a particularly clear picture of the state of party politics. At its height, in the 1980s, the membership of the Labour Party was about 80 000. This dropped to about a tenth of that figure during the 1980s, and the party is now believed to have about 5000 paid up members (Kirk 1996b). When Muldoon first became Prime Minister in 1975, National Party membership was about 200 000, but by the early 1990s it was less than 45 000 (Upton 1995; and Armstrong 1994). New Zealand First is almost without a membership, and even the Alliance – the political party that claims to be based on mass membership has less than 10 000 members. Act – which has invested a huge amount of money promoting membership of the party – also has few members (Kirk 1996a). Furthermore, young people in particular are no longer joining political parties in large numbers. In 1994 the Electoral Commission found that, based on survey evidence, only two percent of all those that belonged to political parties were under the age of 30 years old, while ‘three-quarters were over 50 years of age, and 39 per cent were aged 70 and over’ (Harris 1998, 16, 22).
[9] Likewise, this has an international parallel, with the more dynamic and ideological politicians of Thatcher, Reagan, and Keating, having been replaced in recent years by the bland pragmatists of Blair, Clinton and Howard. Also as Dogan has argued: Empirical research has shown that there has been a significant reduction in ideological space over the last few decades. Assuming the distance between the extremes of right and left to have been one metre in 1960, it would today be no greater than a few decimetres, particularly in those countries that experienced extreme polarization in the 1950s (Dogan 1996, 535).
[10] See Miller (1997); Edwards (1994); Jones (1992, 80).
[11] In terms of industrial relations, see Millar (1996) for an outline of the similarities between Labour and National’s approach to industrial relations.
[12] Helen Clark claimed that such significant differences did indeed exist. According to Edwards she claimed the ‘repeal of the Employment Contracts Act, health changes and tax increases were all litmus issues’ (Edwards 1994, 11). See also James (1993 chapter 17 and 1994a); Laugesen (1998b)
[13] Examining Labour’s 1993 election manifesto, Elizabeth McLeay noted that Labour had argued that, ‘National and Labour were “at opposite sides of a vast chasm”, [and] were “fundamentally at odds.” The word “differences” was repeatedly used, as if saying something often enough would make it true’ (McLeay 1994, 44-45).
[14] According to McLeay, Boston et al. ‘in 1975 only 20.3 per cent of a nationwide sample agreed with the statement that, “There is so little difference between National and Labour these days on policy issues that it doesn’t matter much which party you vote for.” In 1990, Levine and Roberts found in their Miramar survey (200 interviews) that 52.3 per cent saw not much difference, or no difference, between Labour and National’ (McLeay, Boston et al. 1996, 25). See also Levine and Roberts (1991); Collinge (1991).
[15] See Heal (1996, 61-62); McLeay, Boston et al., (1996: p.25); See Harmel and Janda (1982); Gamlin (1998a); McLeay and Boston et al. (1996, 25); Vowles (1998, 28).
[16] Boston and McLeay have made a good arguement that, despite popular belief and the rhetoric of NZ First, ‘the additional public expenditure agreed upon within the coalition agreement is very modest’ (p.233).
[17] According to Alliance insider John Robinson, the ‘Alliance set a goal in 1994 of achieving “full employment” in 10 or 12 years time. That is a very long time indeed. But also their definition of “full employment” would leave many people - 2 to 3 per cent of the work force or about 30,000 people - still out of work. Such an estimate certainly accords with independent calculations which show that the Alliance budget would do little more than hold unemployment steady for the coming 5 years’ (Robinson 1996, 83).
[18] As Chris Trotter has pointed out: ‘The Alliance’s policies are actually quite moderate when compared to earlier left-wing offerings. Calling for a higher level of progressivity in our tax system, supporting universality – as opposed to targeting – in welfare provision, advocating a limited measure of protection for NZ industries, and expressing doubts about the benefits of international trade agreements such as the WTO or the MAI, hardly constitutes a radical economic and social programme. It’s a policy mix most social democratic parties in northern and western Europe would find unremarkable’ (Trotter 1997b). See also: Rankin (1995) who argues that the Alliance’s tax policies are not radical by historical or international standards.
[19] See Corbett (31 May 1996); Heeringa (1996).
[20] Gordon Campbell reported that ‘during the election run-up, Act hired a firm of Australian spindoctors to shape Act’s image away from new ideas and radical reform – depicting it instead as a party of sense and stability’ (Campbell 21 Sept 1996, 19); see also Fraser and Zangouropoulos (1998).
[21] Voting for the Alliance does not necessarily entail anything radical. Especially for youth, the Alliance is the most conservative or old-fashioned of all the parties (Donald 1998, 45). In its early days, the Alliance gave the impression of representing a movement, but it is clearly now run by a collection of individuals. The Alliance has never established a relationship with any significant section of contemporary society and therefore lacks social roots. Its policy mix depends on the subjective inclinations of individuals from a variety of parties, who make up policies as they go along. Also, since the party has moved closer to Labour, it has been left without any distinctive identity at all, and therefore attracts greatly reduced support. See also: Bennett (1998); Trotter (1997a).
[22] As Simon Carr has noted of New Zealand politics, ‘Real conflict erupts only occasionally; usually the parties lean against each other like sumo wrestlers’ (Carr 1997, 21-22).
[23] To elaborate on the difference between ideological convergence and ideological exhaustion; the New Zealand party system has been subject to two different types of ideological transformation: the first (as outlined in the first section) is a simple “policy convergence” – where there is a movement of parties towards the centre of the left-right continuum. By contrast, the second type of ideological transformation involves the actual decline of ideology per se as a characteristic of party platforms (Jaensch 1994). These two types of phenomenom might often occur as quite separate transformations. The former will not necessarily involve the latter – ie. a party may take up a more moderate programme, yet still hold to the new programme with strong conviction (Orbell and Fougere 1973, 442). However the current political situation is in fact characterised by both tendencies: the New Zealand parties are both shifting towards the centre as well as reducing the degree of ideology that they espouse.
[24] For confirmation of this trend, see Jackson (1991); James (1997, 26).
[25] See Heal (1996, 57); Laugesen (1996; 1998a, 67).
[26] Speden commented in 1995 on the increasing meaningless of the parties’ propaganda: 'Labour, for example, said it would "adopt a co-operative approach to economic management." National said part of its industrial relations policy was to "monitor trends in both the workplace and the economy so that employers and employees benefit from a dynamic marketplace." Topping all comers in inanity, Peter Dunne's Future NZ said "supporting the police in their primary role of preventing crime" was part of its law and order policy…. Nor can anyone resist reviewing anything. It is, of course, the obvious thing to do when you have no real ideas. Only marginally more creative were the endless promises to streamline, improve efficiency, cut red tape and increase access to services' (Speden 21 April 1995, 18).
[27] Act also used the slogan, “Good government is good housekeeping” and it’s election manifesto was entitled “Commonsense for Change”. In 1996 an Act spokesperson said that the party was attempting to shift ‘the party’s appeal from the head to the heart’ illustrating their intentions to emphasise emotion over policy in order to attract votes (Heeringa, 1996); see also Fraser and Zangouropoulos (1998, 50).
[28] See Furedi (1997).
[29] A good example of the attempt to paint to paint an opponent as ideologically extreme was provided by Act MP Richard Prebble when he responded in October 1997 to Labour MP Michael Cullen’s plan to create a compulsory, state-controlled superannuation fund. Prebble said: ‘There’s a name for this sort of state control of the economy its communism!’ (quoted in Trotter 1997b).
[30] For examples of this, see James (1993b, 203; 1993c).
[31] See also:SM Lipset (1963, 443-444).
[32] It used to be assumed that in the election campaign ‘only relatively few voters would be affected by such short-term factors as leaders, propaganda and events and issues emerging in the campaign' (Jaensch 1994, 228). Now however, these more trivial and superficial factors are indeed affecting voter decisions. For instance, Johnston found that before the 1996 election campaign began, ‘fewer than half the voters had made up their minds how they would vote, and those who had would have produced a very different outcome from the eventual election result. The distribution of party preferences changed significantly during the campaign period from the beginning of September’ (Johnston 1998, 66).
[33] Gustafson (1993, 80).
[34] See Bayliss (1994, 70-71); Hubbard (1998).
[35] See Denemark (1990, 271, 287).
[36] See Trotter (1997a); James (1993, 266; 1997b).
[37] See Berman (1997, 107-108).
[38] See Jupp (1982, 23-26).
[39] See Gustafson (1994).
[40] In Western countries like New Zealand, it is not just class, but also other traditional indicators of electoral behaviour, such as religion, region, and the urban-rural cleavage that are of decreasing political significance (Kemp, 1978: p.348).
[41] The reasons for the declining relevance of class is a second-level question. The point is that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the class basis of the New Zealand party system is in a process of weakening.
[42] See Kelsey (1995, 25).
[43] As Kelsey has written, ‘Party and parliamentary leadership of both Labour and National became dominated by professionals divorced from the traditional class base’ (Kelsey 1995, 26).
[44] See Vowles (1994).
[45] See Bean (1988: pp.303-321); Gold 1992 p.489; Etc.
[46] The declining level of traditional working class militancy is indicated by the sharp drop in strike activity and the drop in union membership. While in December 1995 there were 259 trade unions and 683 006 union members (43.5% of the workforce), by December 1996 there were only 83 unions representing 339 327 members (19.9% of the workforce). While in 1996 there was 1 329 054 ‘person days of work lost’ in the New Zealand economy, by 1997 this figure was down to 24 614 (Statistics NZ 1998, 323).
[47] As Kemp has argued, 'The stability of the parties has depended on the stability of their traditional bases of support. As these diminish, the result must be to introduce new elements of instability into the party– creating internal party instability and party system fragmentation and fluidity’ (Kemp 1978, 359).
[48] While the new policy consensus of the 1990s shares some similarities with the policy convergence of the 1950s and 1960s the political eras are different in the respect that the basis for understanding political actions has totally changed. While the left-right distinction is no longer very useful, it was still appropriate during the postwar years.
[49] According to Gustafson, 'some writers have suggested that partisan dealignment might not be followed by a new realignment and that what is occurring in western democracies is "the onward march of party decomposition" ' (Gustafson, 1993: p.73).