Although New Zealand was home to the first national green party in the world, it was almost a quarter of a century before a green politician sat in the House of Representatives. This blog post details the development of the New Zealand Green Party from its origins through to the 2005 election, and discusses the transition of the Green Party from a fringe movement to a political party with a sustained parliamentary presence. This phase of the Green Party’s history is largely defined by its ‘outsider’ status and its ability to capitalise on voter disillusionment. Following electoral reform and the party’s entry into Parliament, this outsider status became problematic and the Greens had to revaluate their positioning and strategy, looking instead to project more of an ‘insider’ status. This blog post is the third of five, written by Niki Lomax, based on her recent University of Otago Politics Department Honour dissertation which discusses the path the Greens’ have taken to get to this point, focusing on what has made the Green Party successful and what barriers has it faced in its quest for success. [Read more below]
The world’s first green party
Like its European counterparts, the New Zealand Green Party can directly trace its origins to the post-war emergence of ‘new politics’ and new social movements (NSMs). The multifarious grassroots movements that emerged in the 1970s, collectively termed NSMs, concerned a diverse set of issues: environmental, peace, anti-authoritarian, anti-institutional, anti-racist, anti-nuclear, women’s rights, Māori rights and gay rights. In the late 1960s in New Zealand, anti-Vietnam and anti-apartheid movements established a tradition of extra-parliamentary direct democracy that became the foundation for NSM organisation in the 1970s. Some 35,000 people in major centres around the country marched against New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam in the early 1970s. This period saw environmentalism and conservation propelled onto the national agenda for the first time. This was partly thanks to the success of the Save Manapouri campaign, a campaign to prevent the raising of the Manapouri Lake as part of a power scheme in Fiordland. This was New Zealand’s first mass environmental movement and culminated in a petition that attracted 264,000 signatures, representing almost ten percent of the population. French nuclear testing in the pacific was also a high profile issue; in 1973 the Government deployed two frigates to the Pacific to protest against the testing, and later that year they took France to the World Court over their continued atmospheric testing on the Mururoa Atoll.
Against a background of activism and in response to disillusionment with mainstream politics, in 1972 the Values Party was formed. The Values Party was the first national green party in the world. At its height, Values received 5.2 percent of the vote in the 1975 general election and boasted 2,000 members. The Values Party’s name reflected the fact that neither the National nor the Labour parties represented the revolution in social values that had occurred in the late sixties, early seventies. Values’ policies echoed the values that the extra-parliamentary NSMs represented and their organisational model reflected traditions of participatory democracy and decentralisation. However, the Values Party were not a NSM; they were a political party. They worked with the system rather than against it. In saying this, due to their unorthodox organisational structure, the Values Party could be described as one of the first examples of an ‘anti-party party’ (APP).
Values were always going to be limited by the fact that under a first-past-the post (FPP) electoral system, parliamentary representation is enormously difficult for a minor party to achieve without geographically concentrated support. After their impressive 1975 result, their support rapidly declined. Internal conflict between the more moderate middle class members within the party and anarchic socialist factions was also detrimental to success. By the 1980s, the Values Party had all but faded into obscurity.
The revival of green politics and the pursuit of representation
In May 1990 the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand was formed. By this time green parties existed in almost every developed industrial nation, so a revival of green politics in New Zealand to was some extent inevitable. Due to their stance on nuclear issues in the 1980s the Labour Party had largely filled the positional vacuum left by the Values Party. Under FPP, a vote for Values was a protest vote as the Party had no realistic chance of winning any seats. Many felt supporting the Labour Party was more likely to advance the anti-nuclear cause.
However, as political scientist Stephen Rainbow observed: ‘By 1990 disillusionment with the Labour Government’s economic policies was so widespread that Labour’s environmental advocacy was insufficient to maintain the support of the latent green constituency.’ This disillusionment facilitated the establishment and early electoral success of the newly formed Green Party. The new party lacked clear policy or party structure, had no designated leader, the media portrayed them as idealistic yet vacuous, and they faced condemnation from the Labour Party who feared that a split in the left constituency would facilitate a National victory. Despite all this, the Green Party won 6.85 percent of the vote. Furthermore, the Greens only contested 71 of 90 seats in 1990; if they had contested every seat their total vote would have been closer to 9 percent. Therefore, while they did not receive any seats in Parliament, this result was a significant achievement. On the back of anti-Labour, anti-nuclear sentiment, the Greens maintained poll results in the vicinity of 10 percent throughout the early 1990s.
Soon it became clear that, as had been the case for the Values Party, FPP presented a fundamental barrier to the Greens’ success. The Green Party’s election result had largely been the consequence of a reaction against the major parties and lack of confidence in incumbent politicians. Writing in 1991, Rainbow predicted that in 1993 Labour would recapture much of the vote it had lost, and the Green vote would be reduced to ‘first-time voters and members of alternative communities.’ Rather than face this inevitability, the Green Party opted instead to join the Alliance; a coalition of left-wing parties led by ex-Labour Party president Jim Anderton, and leader of the NewLabour Party. In the 1990 election, NewLabour and the Greens had been in direct competition for the disillusioned anti-Labour vote and together they had captured 12 percent of the popular vote. The Alliance was Anderton’s attempt to unite the anti-Labour vote and create a single political force. Comprised of five minor left-wing political parties, NewLabour, the Green Party, Mana Motuhake, the Democrats, and the Liberals, Alliance managed to win 18.2 percent of the popular vote in the 1993 election.
Electoral systems are an important factor for minor party success. Proportional representation (PR) systems facilitate the development of new parties while plurality systems, like FPP, generally hinder their electoral performance.  The experiences of Alliance exemplify this. If the 1993 election had been under a PR system, Alliance could have had around 20 MPs in parliament; however under FPP, despite 18.2 percent of the vote, they only secured two seats. Understandably, Alliance were strong supporters of the 1992-3 campaign to adopt a Mixed-Member-Proportional (MMP) electoral system. The success of this campaign, and the subsequent electoral reform was hugely beneficial for Alliance and other minor parties. In the 1996 election, although Alliance’s share of the vote dropped to 10.1 percent, they won thirteen seats in parliament. Among these thirteen MPs were Green Party members Jeanette Fitzsimmons, Rod Donald and Phillida Bunkle. The impact of MMP was immediate. Without MMP it is entirely possible that the Greens would never have entered parliament and would have faded into obscurity as the Values Party did in the 1980s.
1999: The Greens go it alone
The loss of support for Alliance between 1993 and 1996 can be largely attributed to factionalism and internal conflict. In 1997 the Greens announced they would be leaving Alliance and would contest the 1999 election independently. Fitzsimons and Donald remained Alliance MPs in Parliament until September 1999, which caused considerable confusion among the media, party members and party supporters. This was not an ideal way to begin their 1999 campaign and in the months after announcing their departure from Alliance polls indicated support for the Green Party was less than 1 percent.
The 1999 election campaign was a challenging one for the Green Party. The media paid them very little attention and the Greens found it difficult to be taken seriously. Their poor poll results saw them excluded from a televised election debate and they were completely absent from a Dominion Post election lift-out, although the paper later claimed this was unintentional. Despite this lack of coverage, a strong grassroots campaign saw the Greens make some gains. The party deliberately engaged in subversive protest action to gain headlines and reinforce their status as an activist party. For example, the Green Party affiliated ‘Wild Green’ activist network led by Green candidate Nándor Tánczos made headlines after they dug up a crop of genetically engineered (GE) potatoes. A month later, Tánczos was selected as the Greens’ candidate for Auckland Central. The Greens at this time actively promoted their ‘hippie’ image, or the NSM factor, and placed a strong emphasis on activism and direct democracy. As Values had done in the 1970s, they deliberately adopted an APP model with the intention of courting the disillusioned vote.
The Green Party also faced considerable hostility and attack advertising emanating from the National Party. Ten days before the election National Party MP Nick Smith alleged the Green Party website had a link to an eco-terrorism manual that gave advice on how to blow up cars and sink ships. National also distributed a postcard in the Coromandel that read: ‘Under MMP a vote for Jeanette Fitzsimmons will help elect Sue Bradford and Nándor Tánczos. Think before you vote.’ The ‘credentials’ of these three candidates were then listed, which for Bradford included ‘Unemployed for years’ and ‘Avowed Communist and Marxist’ and for Tánczos; ‘Openly supports sabotage’ and ‘Rastafarian’. These attacks demonstrate how the NSM factor can and has been used against them. Rod Donald stated in 2000 that such attacks probably cost the Greens some support, although he suggests that because it increased their media exposure at a crucial moment in the election the overall impact of the attacks was probably minimal.
Although the Greens faced significant challenges, some things did work in their favour. In an account of the campaign written in 2000, Rod Donald described how their strategy had three key election goals: creating the perception that they could win the seat in the Coromandel, winning the seat in the Coromandel, and winning over 5 percent of the party vote. For a party only just polling in single digits, this was an ambitious task. Their strategy relied on what political scientist Jack Vowles describes as the ‘electorate effect’; that is increased support as a result of the public perception, inferred from published poll results, that a candidate is likely to win their electorate seat thus securing parliamentary entry for the party regardless of whether they make the 5 percent threshold. This has the effect of reassuring voters that a party vote for the Green Party will not be a wasted vote. October poll results in the Coromandel placed Fitzsimmons only a few points behind the incumbent National Party MP Murray McLean and as the election approached, the gap tightened. The Greens’ position was strengthened after Labour leader Helen Clark encouraged Labour supporters to give their electorate vote to Fitzsimons rather than split the left vote and enable McLean to win the seat. Vowles notes that in the 1999 Coromandel race, strategic voting from Labour supporters ‘almost certainly made the crucial difference in the end.
Confidence and supply: the issue of inclusion
On election night, the fate of the Green Party was uncertain. They had fallen marginally short of 5 percent and had failed to win the Coromandel seat; all hope rested with the special votes. In the interim, Labour and Alliance agreed to form a two-party coalition arrangement.  When the final results were confirmed, it emerged that the Greens had managed to not only narrowly win Coromandel, but they had crossed the threshold and won 5.2 percent of the party vote. Although many had expected a red-green coalition, uncertainty surrounding the Greens’ parliamentary status led to them being excluded from a formal coalition. Instead they agreed to support status and a confidence and supply arrangement was formed with the Labour-Alliance government.
This largely adhocratic confidence and supply agreement was troublesome and frustrating for both parties.  The Greens often felt excluded from policy discussions and resented being informed of cabinet decisions at the same time as the media. The key advantage of confidence and supply was that the Greens could distance themselves from the government on some issues, to capitalise on radical disaffection, but also provide loyal support to a popular Labour-led government on the majority of legislation. Political scientist Tim Bale notes that, although the Green leadership were enthusiastic about the idea of forming a coalition in 2002, the Labour Government’s decision to support an American-led war in Afghanistan after the events of September 11 and the Greens subsequent vocal opposition to this decision made a formal coalition unlikely. The relationship between Labour and the Greens deteriorated even further in May 2002 when the seven Green MPs walked out of the debating chamber in protest at the Government’s decision to lift the moratorium on GE trials. This action was condemned by the Prime Minister, who had not been forewarned of the Green MPs plans, and effectively ruled out the viability of a coalition deal between the Greens and Labour in 2002.
Although confidence and supply can have its difficulties, a formal coalition is unlikely to be any easier as such agreements are often problematic for minor parties. The experiences of Die Grünen in the late 1990s are frequently cited as an example of the difficulties of coalition. German Green Party co-leader Joschka Fischer, as Germany’s foreign minister in the ‘red-green’ coalition, was put in a position in 1998 where he had to sanction the deployment of German troops to Kosovo, despite his party’s, and his personal, advocacy of pacifism and links to the German peace movement. This was one of many damaging concessions that led Green supporters, and non-supporters, to question the party’s credibility. As noted by political scientists Dann and Bale: “The opportunities are accompanied by constraints of collective cabinet responsibility and the distinct possibility that, whatever the party’s achievements, it will endure more in-fighting and garner fewer votes in the next election.”
2002: Greens against the world
For the Green Party, the 2002 election was about one issue: GE. Opinion polls conducted early in the campaign suggested that there was significant public concern about the safety of GE, which presumably contributed to the Greens’ initially strong performance in the polls. In mid-July they polled as high as 11 percent. However, their single-issue strategy was flawed in that it positioned the Greens in direct opposition to the Labour Party and effectively ruled out any potential coalition agreement.
GE had already caused bitterness between the parties after the Green Party’s staged walkout in May, and the events of the election campaign only served to intensify this animosity. Tension particularly escalated following the release Seeds of Distrust, a book written by investigative journalist Nicky Hager that alleged the Labour government had covered up the accidental planting of a GE corn crop. Adamantly denying the allegations, Helen Clark accused the media of setting her up and the Greens of playing ‘gutter politics’. This scandal, which became known as ‘Corngate’, initially led to increased support for the Greens but this rapidly fell away as the public began to question the Greens’ involvement and handling of the issue. Fitzsimmons blamed Clark for the shift in public opinion:
The prime minister has kept on saying that we were behind it and that we played dirty politics. We had nothing to do with the book and all we have done is respond to the facts that are in it, not even the allegations that are in it.
Despite strong poll results, on election night the Greens only improved on their 1999 result by two percentage points. Believing they were capable of greater electoral success, the Greens were disappointed.
Before the 2002 election campaign, many believed a red-green coalition was a likely election outcome. However, the impact of the Corngate scandal altered these expectations. By refusing to compromise on the GE issue, although the Greens could be complimented on their principled stance, ultimately it limited their electoral potential. This demonstrates an inherent flaw in the APP model. If a party presents itself as anti-party to the extent that it is unable to work with anyone, this can create the perception that voting for that party will be a wasted vote. Alone, the Greens have no power in parliament to legislate and make progress on policy areas important to their voters. As Katz and Mair discuss, operating outside the ‘cartel’ is not conducive to policy progress.
2005: The world against the Greens
Desperate to overcome their reputation as unreliable extremists, in 2005 the Greens focused on presenting themselves as a viable coalition partner that was willing to work constructively with the Labour Party. The Greens even published a campaign pamphlet titled ‘Why Green goes so well with red.’ However the 2005 election proved to be difficult for the Green Party, indeed all the minor parties, as several significant external factors constrained their electoral potential.
The first issue concerned the Māori vote. In 2004, Labour MP Tariana Turiaresigned from the Labour caucus and formed the Māori Party. Prior to 2004, the Green Party had enjoyed strong polling among Māori voters; current Green Party co-leader and former campaign manager Russel Norman stated after the 2005 election that the Greens ‘had often been the sole voice in Parliament standing up for Māori interests and this had received some recognition from Māori voters.’ As table 2.1 shows, this support dramatically declined between 2002 and 2005. Competition for the Māori vote significantly increased with the formation of the Māori Party. The Greens tried to overcome this by distributing pamphlets encouraging Māori to split their vote, however the strategy did not have the effect the party had hoped for and their support among Māori more than halved.
Another factor outside the Greens’ control was the distribution of an anti-Green pamphlet by members of the Exclusive Brethren. The pamphlet, titled ‘The Green Delusion’, attacked their ‘communist and socialist ideologies’ and described the Party as ‘economically unsustainable and socially destructive’. This was highly inconvenient in terms of the Greens attempt to shift away from a reputation as radical and destabilising. The Greens were most concerned about the factual inaccuracies in the pamphlet. As Russel Norman stated:
Of course, what we will never know is how damaging the leaflets were. Sure, we gained some media coverage, but we still had people telling us that they would have voted Green but that we wanted to put a capital gains tax on the family home – one of the lies in the Brethren leaflet.
Attacks like this, the 1999 postcard distributed by the National Party being another example, reinforce unfortunate stereotypes for the Greens that draw on imagery from the era of NSMs and the Values Party to portray the Green Party membership as left-wing radicals and ‘dope-smoking hippies’.
Another major hindrance for the Greens in 2005 was the general swing away from minor parties. In 2002, 38 percent of the voters gave their party vote to a minor party; in 2005, this dropped to only 20 percent. This can largely be attributed to the closeness of the race between the two major parties. The two-party race also led to the minor parties receiving significantly less media attention than in past elections; although the Exclusive Brethren helped break this trend for the Greens to some extent. The closeness of the two-party race caused some Green supporters to vote Labour for fear of a National-led government following the election. This strategic voting effect, known as ‘squeezing’, had a significant impact on the Greens’ overall share of the vote. Data from the New Zealand Election Survey (NZES) shows that of those respondents who voted Green in 2002, nearly a quarter of them subsequently voted for Labour in 2005.
In addition to these external challenges, the Green Party also suffered from a poorly executed advertising strategy. In the absence of a single campaign defining issue, the Greens needed to use the 2005 election to consolidate their Green brand and convey that they were more than just an anti-GE party. Their advertising strategy overcompensated for this with a series of complex and visually confusing billboards that covered a wide range of policy issues including: clean energy, healthy food in schools, the brain drain, clean water, fisheries, poverty and public transport. The billboards were very wordy which made them difficult to read from a distance, and oddly none of them included the Green Party logo. As a branding exercise they were clearly ineffective.
The Greens emerged from the 2005 campaign with 5.3 percent of the vote and six seats in Parliament. Although this was a step backwards from their 2002 results, compared with the other minor parties their losses were minimal. The coalition formation process that followed the 2005 election was complex. Labour’s victory had been slim and to form a government Clark needed the support of centrist parties, New Zealand First and United Future. Both parties said they would not support a government that involved the Greens, and so Clark opted for a centre-left coalition that excluded the Green Party. The Greens were clearly disappointed with her decision. Positioned on the left of Labour, the Greens lack the pivotal strategic position to be a useful coalition partner in close elections.
Conclusion: no longer protesters, but permanent outsiders?
Between 1990 and 2005 the New Zealand Green Party evolved from a fringe activist movement to a political party that had achieved sustained parliamentary presence. The greatest facilitative factor in terms of the Greens electoral success in the 1990s was electoral reform. The introduction of MMP saw the first Green MPs enter Parliament, as part of the Alliance in 1996. In the following election, as an independent party, the Greens capitalised on grassroots support and a disillusioned left-wing vote to narrowly secure seven seats in parliament. This connection with the grassroots became an electoral liability to some degree in 2002 and 2005; it reinforced a public perception that they were unreliable hippies who would destabilise the government and legalise drugs. The NSM factor had a positive affect on the party’s electoral success in some aspects, and a negative affect in others. This demonstrates Peter Mair’s point, discussed in the last blog, about the ‘natural limit’ and the problems with the APP model; parties can only rely on appearing as outsiders for so long. The Greens’ conflict with the Labour Party in this period was another electoral hindrance. Labour was a necessary ally if the Greens wanted to participate in government and while their combative attitude over the GE issue may have won support among core Green activists, it ultimately made a constructive working relationship with the Labour Party problematic. This combined with the general swing away from minor parties because of the major party ‘squeeze’ lead to an electoral result in 2005 that was not as high as the party had hoped it would be.
According to Müller-Rommel’s definition, by 2005 the New Zealand Green Party was successful; they had contested at least two elections in which they had received at least three percent of the vote. However, this is a very low threshold for defining success. Rather than success, it is more accurate to say that by 2005 the Greens had achieved existence; in every MMP election they had contested independently, they had made it over the five percent threshold and secured parliamentary representation. When European theorists discuss ‘green success’, largely what they tend to mean is consistent presence in a parliamentary context. If this definition of success is extended to include factors like government participation, or influential parliamentary presence, it becomes more difficult to define the Green Party as ‘successful’ at this point in its history. Certainly, 2005 marks a turning point in Green ambition. They had achieved existence; if they wanted to achieve political inclusion and have greater influence over policy, a change of strategy was required.
Next blog post - Vote for me (Part 4): The Greens go into the Suburbs
The above blog post is the second of five posts taken from a dissertation submitted for the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Honours) at the University of Otago, by Niki Lomax, and entitled ‘Vote for Me: The Green Party’s quest for success’. Niki can be contacted at: email@example.com The dissertation was supervised by Bryce Edwards.
 Toby Boraman, “The New Left and Anarchism in New Zealand from 1956 to the Early 1980s: An Anarchist Communist Interpretation,” (PhD thesis, University of Otago, 2006), 358.
 Boraman, Rabble Rousers and Merry Pranksters: a History of Anarchism in Aotearoa/New Zealand from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s (Christchurch, N.Z: Katipo Books, 2007), 29.
Helen Bain, “Manapouri: A Green Awakening,” Forest and Bird 7 May, 2008, accessed 3 Septeber, 2011, http://www.forestandbird.org.nz/what-we-do/publications/forest-bird-magazine/articles-archive/manapouri-green-awakening.
 “Nuclear testing in the Pacific - nuclear free New Zealand,” Ministry of Culture and Heritage, accessed 3 October, 2011, http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/nuclear-free-new-zealand/testing-in-the-pacific.
 The term ‘green party’ did not exist until 1980 with the formation of Die Grünen. However, based on their policies, which emphasised both environmentalism and social justice, it is accurate to retrospectively describe the Values Party as a green party. See: New Zealand Values Party, Beyond Tomorrow: 1975 Values Party Manifesto (Wellington: The Values Party, 1975).
 Boraman, Rabble Rousers and Merry Pranksters: a History of Anarchism in Aotearoa/New Zealand from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, 81.
 This description is retrospective. As discussed in the last blog post, the term ‘anti-party party’ was first used in reference to Die Grünen. See: Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism in the West, 171.
 Boraman, “The New Left and Anarchism in New Zealand from 1956 to the Early 1980s: An Anarchist Communist Interpretation,” 689.
 Stephen Rainbow, “Is History Bound to Repeat Itself? The Greens and the 1990 New Zealand General Election,” in The 1990 General Election: Perspectives on Political Change in New Zealand, ed. E. M. McLeay (Wellington, N.Z.: Department of Politics Victoria University of Wellington, 1991), 26. Rainbow was a Green Party candidate for Wellington Central in the 1990 election.
 Ibid., 29, 31-32.
 See: “Labour Would Win in New Zealand if General Election Conducted in October - Oct 91,” Roy Morgan Research, accessed 20 July, 2011, http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/1991/2189/ and
Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer, Voters' Vengence: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), 128.
 “Labour Would Win in New Zealand if General Election Conducted in October - Oct 91.”
 Rainbow, “Is History Bound to Repeat Itself? The Greens and the 1990 New Zealand General Election,” 33.
 The NewLabour Party was formed in 1989 by Anderton and other disillusioned member of the Labour caucus who opposed the reforms of the Fourth Labour Government. For further discussion of the Alliance Party see: Chris Trotter, “Alliance,” in New Zealand Government and Politics, New edition, ed. Raymond Miller (Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press, 2001).
 “General elections 1890-1993 - seats won by party,” New Zealand Electoral Commission, accessed 3 September, 2011, http://www.elections.org.nz/elections/resultsdata/fpp-seats-won.html.
 Müller-Rommel, “Explaining the Electoral Success of Green Parties: A Cross-National Analysis,” 149.
 MMP, the PR system used in German Bundestag elections, was recommended by the 1986 Royal Commission on the Electoral System. The breakdown of public trust and confidence in the major parties following the ‘Rogernomics’ reforms of the 1980s had led to calls for a referendum on the electoral system. Both National and Labour during the 1990 election campaign promised to hold referenda on electoral reforms. See: “From FPP to MMP,” New Zealand Electoral Commission, 3 September, 2011, http://www.elections.org.nz/voting/mmp/history-mmp.html. For further discussion of this electoral reform see Chapter 10 ‘The Referendum’ in: Jack Vowles et al., Towards Consensus?: The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional Representation (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 1995).
 “New Zealand Election Results,” New Zealand Electoral Commission, accessed 24 September, 2011, http://electionresults.govt.nz/.
 Trotter, “Alliance,” 258-59.
 Rod Donald, “The Green Party Campaign,” in Left Turn: The New Zealand General Election of 1999, ed. Jonathan Boston, et al. (Wellington, N.Z.: Victoria University Press, 2000), 48.
 Ibid., 49.
 Ibid., 53.
 Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, “Wild Greens Not Vandals”, press release, 12 March, 1999, accessed 4 October, 2011, http://www.greens.org.nz/press-releases/wild-greens-not-vandals.
 Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, “Wild Green a candidate for Auckland Central,” press release, 22 April, 1999, accessed 4 October, 2011, http://www.greens.org.nz/press-releases/wild-green-candidate-auckland-central.
 New Zealand Government, “Greens Internet Guide to Eco-Terrorism,” press release, 17 November, 1999, accessed 4 October, 2011, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA9911/S00385.htm.
 The New Zealand National Party, “The Greens: Worrying facts you need to know,” (Election Postcard, 1999).
 Donald, "The Green Party Campaign," 55.
 Ibid., 49.
 Jack Vowles, “Did the Polls Influence the Vote? A case study of the 1999 New Zealand general election,” Political Science 54, no. 1 (2002): 72.
 Jonathan Hill, “The Greens Look Set to go to Parliament,” Scoop Independent News, 15 November, 1999, accessed 4 October, 2011, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL9911/S00108.htm.
 Vowles, “Did the Polls Influence the Vote? A case study of the 1999 New Zealand general election,” 72.
 Jonathan Boston, “Forming the Coaltion between Labour and the Alliance,” in Left Turn: The New Zealand General Election of 1999, ed. Jonathan Boston, et al. (Wellington, N.Z.: Victoria University Press, 2000), 239.
 Christine Dann and Tim Bale, “Is the Grass Really Greener?: The Rationale and Reality of Support Party Status: A New Zealand Case Study,” Party Politics 8, no. 3 (2002): 356.
 Vernon Small and Anne Beston, “Political bragging rights strain Government coalition,” New Zealand Herald 10 May, 2001, accessed 2 September, 2011, http://www.knowledge-basket.co.nz/search/doc_view. php?d1= nzh02/text/2001/01/20/doc00130.html. This is discussed at length in: Dann and Bale, “Is the Grass Really Greener?: The Rationale and Reality of Support Party Status: A New Zealand Case Study.”
 Tim Bale, “'As You Sow, So Shall You Reap': The New Zealand Greens and the General Election of 2002,” Environmental Politics 12, no. 2 (2003): 141.
 Ibid., 143.
 Raymond Miller and Jeffrey Karp, “A Vote for Coalition Government?,” in Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government, ed. Jack Vowles, et al. (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 2004), 137.
 Rüdig, “Germany,” 94.
 Dann and Bale, “Is the Grass Really Greener?: The Rationale and Reality of Support Party Status: A New Zealand Case Study,” 350.
 Bale, “'As You Sow, So Shall You Reap': The New Zealand Greens and the General Election of 2002,” 143.
Hager’s book was released on the 11th of July, only two weeks before the 2002 general election. See: Nicky Hager, Seeds of Distrust (Nelson, N.Z.: Craig Potton Publishing, 2002).
 “‘Corngate’ could leave a nasty taste,’ TVNZ, 12 July, 2002, accessed 24 September, 2011, http://tvnz.co.nz/content/115681/2556418.xhtml.
 Jack Vowles, "Estimating Change During the Campaign,” in Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government, ed. Jack Vowles, et al. (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 2004), 36-7.
 Helen Clark quote ed in: Nicholas Maling, “Greens losers in corngate,” Sunday Star Times, 14th July 2002
 “New Zealand Election Results,” New Zealand Electoral Commission, accessed 24 September, 2011, http://electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2002/.
 André Blaise, Peter Loewen, and Marc-André Bodet, “Strategic Voting,” in Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government, ed. Jack Vowles, et al. (Auckland, N.Z: Auckland University Press, 2004), 74. For further discussion of pre-election expectations in 2002 see: Shaun Bowler, Jeffrey A. Karp, and Todd Donovan, “Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from New Zealand,” Electoral Studies 29, no. 3 (2010).
 For further discussion on the idea of a ‘wasted vote’ see: Bruce E. Cain, “Strategic Voting in Britain,” American Journal of Political Science 22, no. 3 (1978): 640.
 Mair and Katz, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party.”
 Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, “Why Green goes so well with red…,” (Election pamphlet, 2005).
 Data from: “New Zealand Election Results,” New Zealand Electoral Commission, accessed 24 September, 2011, http://electionresults.govt.nz/.
 Russel Norman, "The Greens – The Campaign and its Challenges," in The Baubles of Office: the New Zealand General Election of 2005, ed. Stephen I. Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (Wellington, N.Z.: Victoria University Press, 2007), 128.
Errol Kiong, “Sect member behind political pamphlets,” New Zealand Herald, 7 September, 2005, accessed 3 October, 2011, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/exclusive-brethren/news/article.cfm?o_id=600549&objectid= 10344402.
 “The Green Delusion” (Election pamphlet, 2005)
 Norman, “The Greens – The Campaign and its Challenges,” 131.
 See: “New Zealand Election Results,” New Zealand Electoral Commission, accessed 24 September, 2011, http://electionresults.govt.nz/.
 Raymond Miller, “The Parties' Campaigns in Perspective,” in Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government., ed. Jack Vowles, et al. (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 2004), 162.
 Cain, “Strategic Voting in Britain,” 639.
 A table showing estimated vote flows between the 2002 and 2005 elections is available for download from: “Results from the 2005 NZES,” New Zealand Election Study, accessed 30 August, 2011, http://www.nzes.org/exec/show/2005_NZES+Results.
 Nigel S. Roberts, “Changing Spots: Political Party Billboard Battles in New Zealand in 2005,” in The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 2005, ed. Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (Wellington, N.Z.: Victoria University Press, 2007), 276.
 See figure 3.1a on page 32 for an example of these 2005 billboards.
 “New Zealand Election Results,” New Zealand Electoral Commission, accessed 24 September, 2011, http://electionresults.govt.nz/.
 Jonathan Boston, “Dynamics of Government Formation,” in New Zealand Government & Politics, Fifth Edition, ed. Raymond Miller (Melbourne, Vic: Oxford University Press, 2010), 219.
 Müller-Rommel, “Explaining the Electoral Success of Green Parties: A Cross-National Analysis,” 147.