The Maori Party had three related objectives for the 2008 campaign: to win all seven Maori electorates, gain greater recognition as the ‘Treaty partner’ in Parliament, and have a role in the next government. Thus the party sought to project itself as the independent kingmaker of the election, hoping to take up the same strategic position that New Zealand First had held as an important player in past coalition negotiations, able to leverage disproportionate policy gains from the major parties. In order to gain this position, the Maori Party had to carefully construct an image of political neutrality between Labour and National. These are the issues that I focus on in the section on the Maori Party within my chapter entitled ‘Party Strategy and the 2008 Election’ which is part of the recently published book Informing Voters? Politics, Media and the New Zealand Election 2008 (edited by Chris Rudd, Janine Hayward and Geoff Craig). This blog post is the 12th of a series of explorations of the chapters from the new book, and it constitutes the original draft section about the Maori Party that I wrote for my chapter. Subsequently this draft was substantially reworked, edited, and condensed for the final book, so please see the published book for the final and ‘authoritative’ version. [Read more below]
Of all the minor parties, Act was the most ideally placed to gain from the centrist transformation of the National Party under John Key. National’s shift into the centre of the political spectrum meant that – unlike when Don Brash led National in 2005 – Act had a large potential market of voters on the right to win. Act did make use of that gap in the market, but was ambivalent and ambiguous about it orientation towards the popular centrist National Party, choosing sometimes to hug its rival and sometimes to bite it. In regards to this, I look at the party’s strategy in the section on the Act Party within my chapter entitled ‘Party Strategy and the 2008 Election’ which is part of the recently published book Informing Voters? Politics, Media and the New Zealand Election 2008 (edited by Chris Rudd, Janine Hayward and Geoff Craig). This blog post is the 11th of a series of explorations of the chapters from the new book, and it constitutes the original draft section about Act that I wrote for my chapter. Subsequently this draft was substantially reworked, edited, and condensed for the final book, so please see the published book for the final and ‘authoritative’ version. [Read more below]
This year's Bruce Jesson Lecture will be given by Robert Wade (Professor of Political Economy at the London School of Economics) on "How to stop the money men from taking over the world (or, when will we face another September 2008)?" The publicity says the following about Wade and his talk: "Taking off from Bruce Jesson’s ‘Only Their Purpose is Mad: ‘The money men take over NZ’, Robert Wade discusses several reforms of the international monetary and financial system aimed at stabilising global financial markets and curbing the power of the financial sector. After considering the easy part -- ‘what should be done’ -- he goes on to discuss ‘what can be done’, nationally, regionally and globally. Professor Robert Wade is one of the world’s most prominent independent thinkers about the contemporary challenges facing the global economy. As professor of political economy at the London School of Economics, Wade espouses a heterdox approach to economics in contrast to the prevailing neoliberal / neoclassical paradigm. As an expatriate New Zealander he has continued to contribute to discussions on New Zealand’s economic direction, including in the context of the global economic crisis."
Wednesday 28 October, 6:30pm Maidment Theatre, Alfred St University of Auckland
Throughout the New Zealand Labour Government’s recent three terms in office (1999-2008), issues of political finance were particularly controversial, culminating with the Electoral Finance Act 2007 (EFA) being widely debated as either a cure or poison for fair elections. But just how much impact did the now-defunct EFA have on the actual 2008 general election campaign? In particularly, how did the new regime impact on the electoral participation of civil society via its various interest groups (now commonly referred to in political finance discussions as ‘third parties’)? Did the predictions made in 2007 that the EFA would put ‘democracy under threat’ come to pass? Certainly during the campaign, many commentators noted that third party organisations were having less input into the campaign debate. Opponents of the EFA complained that the new rules were stymieing freedom of expression and political debate. Some talked of a ‘litigious bomb waiting to go off’ (Otago Daily Times 2008), while other commentators declared that ‘The EFA’s dampening effect on the current election campaign is so serious, it is anti-democratic’ (Clark and Nicholls 2008). Furthermore, just nine weeks out from election day, the head of the Electoral Commission declared that the uncertainty resulting from the legislation was having a ‘chilling effect on the extent and type of participation in political and campaign activity’ (Electoral Commission 2008a). The commission also made a number of controversial decisions during the campaign that suggested the EFA was indeed affecting the campaign. There were minor controversies about the legality of everything from Tui beer billboard advertising to Act Party leader Rodney Hide’s yellow jacket, with a host of other legal rulings and court cases highlighting the legal uncertainty and complexity of the EFA. Yet it was possibly in the area of civil society’s organised interest groups such as trade unions, sector groups, and business associations that the impact was most strongly felt. Below is a draft paper I've written on this issue, which I'm presenting at an academic conference at the end of September. This paper weighs up the evidence, pinpoints where the EFA had the most impact on civil society, and details some of the Electoral Commission’s more controversial and salient decisions. As usual I welcome your feedback and corrections via email or as comments at the end. [Read more below]
Of all the parliamentary parties, New Zealand First’s 2008 election campaign was possibly the most impressive and successful. Obviously the party failed to make it back into Parliament, yet it only just missed out, managing to elevate its public support up from within the ‘margin of error’ of the opinion polls, to 4.1 per cent. The party obtained the fourth highest party vote, and was only denied representation in the new Parliament because of the exclusionary and undemocratic five per cent MMP threshold. New Zealand First actually won a greater proportion of the party vote than both the Act Party and the Maori Party (both of whom were allocated five seats each). Thus, by nearly making it back into Parliament, New Zealand First’s performance belied the projections of most political commentators. I look at the party’s strategy in the section on New Zealand First within my chapter entitled ‘Party Strategy and the 2008 Election’ which is part of the recently published book Informing Voters? Politics, Media and the New Zealand Election 2008 (edited by Chris Rudd, Janine Hayward and Geoff Craig). This blog post is the 10th of a series of explorations of the chapters from the new book, and it constitutes the original draft section about New Zealand First that I wrote for my chapter. Subsequently this draft was substantially reworked, edited, and condensed for the final book, so please see the published book for the final and ‘authoritative’ version. [Read more below]
In 2008 the Green Party was set to become the third largest party in Parliament. To get there the party attempted to take a qualitatively different approach to the past – adopting a highly professsionalised and market-oriented strategy. Taking the ‘Americanisation’ of politics towards its logical conclusion the Green also embraced a very celebrity-focused method of campaigning, while still relying on some traditional minor party media stunts. The party also attempted to break out of its ‘left ghetto’ but with mixed success. These are some of the issues that I focus on in the section on the Green Party within my chapter entitled ‘Party Strategy and the 2008 Election’ which is part of the recently published book Informing Voters? Politics, Media and the New Zealand Election 2008 (edited by Chris Rudd, Janine Hayward and Geoff Craig). This blog post is the ninth of a series of explorations of the chapters from the new book, and it constitutes the original draft section about the Greens that I wrote for my chapter. Subsequently this draft was substantially reworked, edited, and condensed for the final book, so please see the published book for the final and ‘authoritative’ version. [Read more below]
The Labour Party’s 2008 general election campaign strategy had two main flaws: its decision to campaign on the theme of trust (together with a general negativity), and its management of coalition party possibilities. Not only did these strategies fail to fire during the campaign, but instead backfired, contributing to Labour’s failure to remain a truly competitive player in the election. These are the issues that I focus on in the section on the Labour Party within my chapter entitled ‘Party Strategy and the 2008 Election’ which is part of the recently published book Informing Voters? Politics, Media and the New Zealand Election 2008 (edited by Chris Rudd, Janine Hayward and Geoff Craig). This blog post is the eighth of a series of explorations of the chapters from the new book, and it constitutes the original draft section about Labour that I wrote for my chapter. Subsequently this draft was substantially reworked, edited, and condensed for the final book, so please see the published book for the final and ‘authoritative’ version. [Read more below]
The National Party’s 2008 general election campaign strategy was widely criticised for being conservative and uninspiring. There were three main integral elements that contributed to this blandness: an ideologically-centrist election platform, a relatively policy-free approach, and a general ultra-cautious attempt to avoid mistakes or cause offence to any voters. These are the issues that I focus on in the section on the National Party within my chapter entitled ‘Party Strategy and the 2008 Election’ which is part of the recently published book Informing Voters? Politics, Media and the New Zealand Election 2008 (edited by Chris Rudd, Janine Hayward and Geoff Craig). This blog post is the seventh of a series of explorations of the chapters from the new book, and it constitutes the original draft section about National that I wrote for my chapter. Subsequently this draft was substantially reworked, edited, and condensed for the final book, so please see the published book for the final and ‘authoritative’ version. [Read more below]
There’s an important discussion going on over at the Kiwipolitico blog on the question of “Does New Zealand have Public Intellectuals?” This is a topic of great interest to me, and I argued recently in my Drinking Liberally talk on “What’s left in 2009 in New Zealand?” (and subsequently posted on my blog here) that the New Zealand left is currently at an extremely low point partly related to the fact that ‘there’s few leftwing intellectuals of any prominence’ anymore, which seemed to spark some interest and debate. As a contribution to the ongoing debate at Kiwipolitico (and now on Chris Trotter’s Bowalley Road blog here), I’ve republished my own review of the seminar 2008 book entitled Speaking Truth to Power, edited by Laurence Simmons. My review was published in early 2008 in the Political Science journal. At the time I also published extensive explorations of the various chapters of Speaking Truth to Power. Here are the links to the relevant blog posts on Bruce Jesson, Nicky Hager, Brian Easton, Jane Kelsey, Sandra Coney, Laurence Simmons, Michael King, Roger Horrocks, Belich, Waring and Walker, as well as my posts about Chris Trotter’s review of the book, and Mark Broatch’s Sunday Star Times book review. But my own review is below. [Read more below]
Which of Labour and National instigated last years’ blocking of minor parties from the TV leaders election debates? The answer is in a chapter by Geoffrey Craig entitled ‘Leaders’ Debates and News Media Interviews’, which is in the recently published book Informing Voters? Politics, Media and the New Zealand Election 2008 (edited by Chris Rudd, Janine Hayward and Geoff Craig of the University of Otago Politics department). This blog post is the sixth of a series of explorations of the chapters from the new book (which I also have a chapter in). Craig has put together a chapter that nicely chronicles the various debates that played a central role in the 2008 election campaign. [Read more below]
